According to the authors, China pursued multiple agendas -- not only its "national interest" in climate markets, but also cementing its "leadership role in the developing world." However, in their estimation, India was really the big surprise -- a potential ally to the West who has been pushed into common cause with China. (Even though the countries may not have the same needs and are at different points in their paths to development). While India is often cited as a counterweight to Chinese influence in Asia, they warn that if the West (and the U.S. in particular) do not carefully cultivate that alliance, the relationship between New Delhi and Beijing may become increasingly cooperative.
Lesson: "The West made the mistake in Copenhagen of lumping India together with China, and this mistaken view proved to be self-fulfilling." [NOTE: In Schneider's COP15 class, we watched this "bundling" happen over and over again. It was a big problem.]
Copenhagen Consequences for the U.S., China and India
The frantic post-conference scramble for high ground shows that whatever it was that happened at Copenhagen, it was not expected. At least not by the United States... to understand what really happened and why, it is necessary to take a step back and take a wider perspective - one that includes not only the climate accord, but also the global economic situation and geopolitics.
From the perspective of the United States, European Union and other industrialized countries, the focus was largely on creating financial mechanisms around carbon trading, technology transfers, financing for "green tech," economic growth targets and verification regimes. It would have been more accurate to bill it a "climate market" conference.... With the right deal the global carbon market alone, worth an estimated US$118 billion in 2008, could potentially be worth more than US$2 trillion by 2020....
Negotiators from the United States, European Union and other industrialized countries had been working on this financial track for a long time, and likely believed going in to Copenhagen that the groundwork had been laid for such a deal. The assumption was likely that China, given enough incentives - especially around technology transfer - would sign on out of self-interest, and others such as India would give in to pressure to accede rather than risk isolation.
However, while the West was largely looking at Copenhagen as a climate market deal, others were taking a more multi-faceted view. China, as it often does in international negotiations, was pursuing multiple agendas. It engaged in climate market negotiations to press for national advantage, but was also using the meeting to cement its role as a leadership voice in the developing world. This was to be expected.
The article's analysis on India:
The big surprise was India. After sending some mixed messages before the conference, New Delhi finally made it clear that as far as it was concerned the meeting was about long-term strategic options. It questioned the good faith of the Western negotiators, with at least one Indian strategist pointing out that some of the same people involved in credit default swaps that contributed to the collapse of the global financial system were involved in setting up carbon trading....
India didn't like or trust the proposed deal and wanted to show the West that a compliant India could not be taken for granted. Just as important, it wanted to show that, should a perceived fair deal with the West not be possible, it had other options, namely a closer relationship with China. This dovetailed with a broader strategic reevaluation of the India-China relationship.
China is aware that some think India should be used to counter it, and would like to increase cooperation, rather than competition, with its Himalayan neighbor so that it can focus on other arenas. And India is questioning if it should allow itself to be used as a pawn against China, taking a loss both economically and in terms of security, but seeing little benefit.
As a result, a fascinating and potentially game-changing geopolitical pas-de-deux unfolded in Copenhagen. The international media and punditocracy christened the United States and China the new G2, in reference to the expected preeminent leadership roles of the United States and China of their respective developed and developing country contingents. But what increasingly became clear was that a different G2 was influencing the agenda: China and India.
India demonstrated that, while it wants an equal alliance with the United States and its Western allies, a subservient allegiance is not an option."
The authors finish with this recommendation:
The gain of getting the world's most populous democracy on its side - not on China's - is worth some concessions, not just for the sake of a climate deal but for larger strategic purposes. The West made the mistake in Copenhagen of lumping India together with China, and this mistaken view proved to be self-fulfilling. Analysis of India has long suffered from "hyphenation." First it was India-Pakistan, now India-China. At the beginning the India-China link was competitive; Copenhagen has shown it has the potential to become cooperative. The time has come to rehyphenate democratic, economically strong, English-speaking India. It would be to the benefit of the United States and its allies to create a new cooperative link: India-United States.
Article URL: http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2010/01/04/copenhagen_consequences_for_the_us_china_and_india/1537
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