A hagiographic account from the Chinese Foreign Ministry of Premiere Wen Jiabao's brave and noble exploits at the Fifteenth Conference of Parties.
In the far-off realm of Copenhagen, Denmark, where snow and ice covered the earth, and subjects from many lands roamed the hallways of the Bella Center ...
Verdant Mountains Cannot Stop Water Flowing; Eastward the River Keeps on Going
Readers, please take no offense! I mean this all tongue in cheek. (Though I suspect the authors did not. ^ ^)
Thursday, December 31, 2009
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Sing their praises...
More laudatory pieces in the Chinese media this week:
The key words here? "Sincerity, Confidence and Determination"
Allies from around the world have also joined in to tell China, "We've got your back!"
I feel like I'm editing CENA all over again, ha ha.
Undeniable facts showed China, by demonstrating sincerity, confidence and determination, has exerted maximum efforts to move forward the Copenhagen climate change negotiations with an eye on striking a widely accepted accord.
China plays key role making Copenhagen talks successful (Xinhua)
The key words here? "Sincerity, Confidence and Determination"
Allies from around the world have also joined in to tell China, "We've got your back!"
World media reports have praised China's efforts in promoting international cooperation to combat climate change and its contribution to a substantive result at the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. The per capita carbon emission in China is far lower than that in Western countries, the state media from different countries, including India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Central Africa Republic and Malawi, said recently. Acknowledging that China was facing a heavy task of development, they said that China's demand for due right to development was justifiable and reasonable.
During the Copenhagen Conference, China made all efforts to communicate and negotiate with other countries. It especially brought together developing nations to jointly safeguard their common interests and made a remarkable contribution to a substantive result of the conference, they said. Meanwhile, media in small island states, including Antigua and Barbuda, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, also spoke highly of China's responsible attitude and forceful measures on tackling climate change, saying China's effort could match that of any developed countries.
They said that some countries' criticism of China on the issue was groundless and irresponsible.
World media reports praise China's contribution to Copenhagen climate talks (Xinhua)
I feel like I'm editing CENA all over again, ha ha.
Compare and Contrast
A split-screen view of Wen Jiabao and Obama's Friday at the Bella Center would be extremely fun. In fact, I think I might make that later today!
The Chinese POV:
in contrast to the Obama show:
Obama raced clock, chaos, comedy for climate deal (AP)
Also take a look at the transcript of a briefing to the White House Press Gaggle on board Air Force One -- it's really worth a read! Agence France-Presse also has its version.
Obama raced clock, chaos, comedy for climate deal (AP)
Also take a look at the transcript of a briefing to the White House Press Gaggle on board Air Force One -- it's really worth a read! Agence France-Presse also has its version.
Sunday, December 27, 2009
"I don't want to say the gentleman is ignorant..."
Searched YouTube for the actual video of He Yafei bashing U.S. climate envoy Todd Stern for stating that funding would not be going to China.
Stern had been quoted as saying: "I do not envision public funds, certainly not from the US, going to China. We would intend to direct our public funds to the neediest countries." (Also quoted here.) He noted that "China -- to its great credit -- has a dynamic economy, and sits on some two trillion dollars in reserves. So we don’t think China would be the first candidate for public funding." Needless to say, the Chinese were not pleased.
Stern had been quoted as saying: "I do not envision public funds, certainly not from the US, going to China. We would intend to direct our public funds to the neediest countries." (Also quoted here.) He noted that "China -- to its great credit -- has a dynamic economy, and sits on some two trillion dollars in reserves. So we don’t think China would be the first candidate for public funding." Needless to say, the Chinese were not pleased.
Here's a CCTV report on the same spat: http://english.cctv.com/program/newshour/20091212/101174.shtml.
BONUS VIDEO - White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs threatening to pull out of a meeting when American journalists are blocked from entering a US-China meeting.
SUMMARY - What China accomplished
The short version of my previous post following the end of COP15, on China's role in the climate negotiations:
Up to the last minute, I held out hope that there would be a breakthrough, and during the conference, I was as inclined to lay responsibility on the Americans as the Chinese for the less-than-ideal outcome. It was only later on that I realized the mistake I had committed.
Like many others, I deluded myself into thinking that climate change was the priority for the Chinese in Copenhagen. I had bought into the narrative of a greening China that is committed to meeting this challenge, but is simply constrained by certain economic and developmental priorities. The Obama visit in November, the carbon intensity target, Beijing's public pronouncements leading up to Copenhagen -- these all pointed to a country that was interested in pursuing a serious global agreement.
In fact, if we look at the behavior of the Chinese delegation over the two weeks of COP15, it was more consistent with the pursuit of "national interest" more traditionally defined -- in IR terms. They intended to send a message to the US and the EU about China's status as a rising power: "The world needs China on board for any arrangement to succeed. Our country has arrived on the world stage, and we will not be dictated to by Western powers. In the future, our concerns -- however we define them -- must be taken into account as real constraints."
While the developed nations -- the Europeans especially -- thought the 40-45% carbon intensity cut was an "initial offer" to start the bargaining, it turned out to be a "final offer." It was something the Chinese were committed to doing regardless of the outcome at Copenhagen. (This was quite a clever move. In offering any sort of commitment, the Chinese went beyond their responsibilities under the Kyoto Protocol, while upholding the "common but differentiated responsibilities" framework as interpreted by the developing world.) Because this figure was already on the table, and because they were ready to act unilaterally, the Chinese did not have much stake in whether COP15 succeeded or failed. This presented an opportunity to advance a different political agenda important to Beijing.
Especially after funding for China was taken off the table in Week 1 (humorous at the time when vice-Foreign Minister He Yafei publicly bashed climate envoy Todd Stern. See video here), if the Chinese ultimately didn't care, there wasn't much else the US could offer to sway them. Furthermore, because the waters were so muddy, it would be easy to deflect blame, so Beijing risked very little to send this signal to the US. In the end, power politics outweighed the environmental impulse on the part of the Chinese.
This doesn't mean the Chinese aren't going to do anything about energy at home -- as NRDC China Program director Barbara Finamore has pointed out, they really do see the benefits of becoming more efficient. (Good for industry, good for competitiveness, good for the government coffer.) Thus, they will be serious about implementing the carbon intensity targets, which are by no means easy to accomplish. Tack onto that the updated Statistics Law that promises severe penalties for officials caught altering numbers, and there are some powerful incentives to get industry and government at all levels moving toward the goal.
In the end though, as an individual from Fiji who was also present at COP15 said to me, "The Chinese weren't here to play ball." After all, you don't keep Wen Jiabao out of the "group" negotiations where Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, and other heads of state are present if you are serious about finding a solution. You only do that if you want to send a different kind of message.
The lesson from Copenhagen? Realism bites back.
Up to the last minute, I held out hope that there would be a breakthrough, and during the conference, I was as inclined to lay responsibility on the Americans as the Chinese for the less-than-ideal outcome. It was only later on that I realized the mistake I had committed.
Like many others, I deluded myself into thinking that climate change was the priority for the Chinese in Copenhagen. I had bought into the narrative of a greening China that is committed to meeting this challenge, but is simply constrained by certain economic and developmental priorities. The Obama visit in November, the carbon intensity target, Beijing's public pronouncements leading up to Copenhagen -- these all pointed to a country that was interested in pursuing a serious global agreement.
In fact, if we look at the behavior of the Chinese delegation over the two weeks of COP15, it was more consistent with the pursuit of "national interest" more traditionally defined -- in IR terms. They intended to send a message to the US and the EU about China's status as a rising power: "The world needs China on board for any arrangement to succeed. Our country has arrived on the world stage, and we will not be dictated to by Western powers. In the future, our concerns -- however we define them -- must be taken into account as real constraints."
While the developed nations -- the Europeans especially -- thought the 40-45% carbon intensity cut was an "initial offer" to start the bargaining, it turned out to be a "final offer." It was something the Chinese were committed to doing regardless of the outcome at Copenhagen. (This was quite a clever move. In offering any sort of commitment, the Chinese went beyond their responsibilities under the Kyoto Protocol, while upholding the "common but differentiated responsibilities" framework as interpreted by the developing world.) Because this figure was already on the table, and because they were ready to act unilaterally, the Chinese did not have much stake in whether COP15 succeeded or failed. This presented an opportunity to advance a different political agenda important to Beijing.
Especially after funding for China was taken off the table in Week 1 (humorous at the time when vice-Foreign Minister He Yafei publicly bashed climate envoy Todd Stern. See video here), if the Chinese ultimately didn't care, there wasn't much else the US could offer to sway them. Furthermore, because the waters were so muddy, it would be easy to deflect blame, so Beijing risked very little to send this signal to the US. In the end, power politics outweighed the environmental impulse on the part of the Chinese.
This doesn't mean the Chinese aren't going to do anything about energy at home -- as NRDC China Program director Barbara Finamore has pointed out, they really do see the benefits of becoming more efficient. (Good for industry, good for competitiveness, good for the government coffer.) Thus, they will be serious about implementing the carbon intensity targets, which are by no means easy to accomplish. Tack onto that the updated Statistics Law that promises severe penalties for officials caught altering numbers, and there are some powerful incentives to get industry and government at all levels moving toward the goal.
In the end though, as an individual from Fiji who was also present at COP15 said to me, "The Chinese weren't here to play ball." After all, you don't keep Wen Jiabao out of the "group" negotiations where Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, and other heads of state are present if you are serious about finding a solution. You only do that if you want to send a different kind of message.
The lesson from Copenhagen? Realism bites back.
Friday, December 25, 2009
Holiday Greetings!
God Jul and 聖誕節快樂 to everyone!
Wishing all the best for mankind and the planet.
Glad to be home with family.
What China accomplished
UPDATE: Condensed version here.
How could this have happened? With mild hopes and expectations seemingly tempered by past experience and current conditions, COP15 was set to achieve a "politically binding" agreement, with a COP15.5 next year to finalize details. Why was the outcome so far from what all parties had been expecting?
I analyze here the role China may have had in these negotiations. It was only on Sunday, after chatting with Yue Li, and then in discussion with a Fijian conference participant on the plane to Frankfurt on Monday, that the terrible realization of what China was up to dawned on me. When I arrived in Calgary, the BBC was reporting Milliband's piece in the Guardian and China's response. Then the next day, a former professor sent me this article discussing how the Chinese delegation behaved, and it was a sad confirmation.
Many of us made the mistake of assuming they had made climate change a priority; we bought into the narrative that "China is greening. The country is doing everything it can to fight climate change, which China itself is vulnerable to. However, it does face certain economic constraints and developmental priorities, which are not unreasonable." We should have realized that, behind the scenes, other forces may have been motivating the Chinese.
Things looked a lot better going into COP15, especially when Beijing announced its carbon intensity commitment back in November. It was a catalyst for India, Brazil and South Africa to follow suit, and it set a positive tone for the negotiations. Though the targets were unambitious, most people thought these represented a starting point for the negotiations -- much as the EU had said 20% reductions were committed, and they would raise it to 30% if a meaningful agreement could be reached. India explicitly stated that its goal (20-25% reduction in carbon intensity) was only a starting point, and it might do more if an “equitable” agreement could be reached. Unfortunately, rather than a starting point for bargaining, the Chinese offer turned out to be the final asking price.
Tack onto that Obama's visit to Beijing in November, and the fact that he changed his arrival in Copenhagen from Dec. 9, the beginning of the conference, to Dec. 18, the last day, and it seemed like something had to have happened behind the scenes that gave the Administration confidence a deal could be reached -- at least enough of a possibility of agreement to risk putting the President's prestige on the line. The fact that 120+ other leaders would be in Copenhagen created a sense of mild optimism for a meaningful outcome. I kept tamping down my expectations in the weeks leading up to COP, but hope still existed.
It was difficult to tell what the Chinese strategy was over the first week and a half in Copenhagen. It really seemed like it could have gone either way. The first week, they were fully in line with the G-77, which was making hard demands. (No more than 1.5 degrees of warming, a lot more funding, deeper emissions cuts from developed countries, etc.) But by all accounts, countries nearly always start off stretching the bounds of what's likely or possible, and give way only later on in the negotiations, with incentives and deals and compromises.
Sadly, compromise was not forthcoming, and progress was very slow. Nations were still very far apart heading into the second week of negotiations. By Tuesday, the second week of the COP, the Chinese were still spouting the hard line "blame the US and the West" rhetoric at their evening press briefing (which took place at 5 PM at their delegation offices, in a little couch area and an adjoining press conference room dubbed the "China Information and Communication Center 中国新闻与交流中心"). Things did not look good ... yet I continued to wonder if this was simply a negotiating tactic, to extract more concessions from the West. No one was truly countenancing failure. In the meantime, much of the rhetoric was coming from the G77 + China bloc, not only China per se, so it was hard to pin it on them. (G77 efforts really seemed well-coordinated, at least on the PR front. You had islands noisily protesting with the help of NGOs; you had G77 spokesperson Lumumba di-Aping of Sudan making dramatic pronouncements about the culpability of developed nations; and you had China, India and others backing them up in a united front.)
On Wednesday, with only 3 days left, we were hoping for the best, but I had a bad, bad feeling that the COP would end without agreement. Throughout the day, I kept turning to my friends and saying, "I hope COP doesn't fail. It would be horrible if things just imploded." It was starting to seem a distinct possibility.
No positive news came out of Bella Center that day. (There was restricted entry, so the Stanford delegation was taking turns getting in with secondary passes. I was in downtown Copenhagen for the afternoon -- the first time I had seen sunlight in several days -- but then the Bella Center stopped NGOs from exiting/entering around 2 p.m., so I wasn't able to make it back in for the 5 p.m. Chinese briefing. However, my friend went to a different briefing by the Finance Minister, and she reported similar rhetoric, specifically on MRV.)
On Thursday morning, things looked absolutely dire -- media were reporting that the Danes were admitting the likelihood of failure, and the Chinese were saying that only a "short political statement" could be expected. But then Secretary Clinton gave her $100 billion in funding speech, and hope was reignited. I spoke to some people familiar with how China operates at these international negotiations, and was told that now the Americans had taken action, had offered something, the door was open to a deal. (I wrote a posting about this here: http://copenhagentime.
MRV (measurement, reporting, verification), the major sticking point, wouldn't have to be intrusive; verification strategies could be devised that were acceptable to all parties -- measures that would respect China's sovereignty, but give enough confidence to the Americans (especially the Senate) that the Chinese were living up to their end of the deal. At that point, it was up to the Chinese to reciprocate: things looked more optimistic, and the stage was set for a potential deal. There was even talk of greater "flexibility" by the Chinese, and media reports transmitted this revived hope.
I kept thinking that with the arrival of Wen Jiabao, the Chinese would suddenly change their tune, at least behind closed doors. The Chinese wouldn't want to be spoilers (or at least wouldn't want to be seen as spoilers), and they were simply waiting for an appropriate moment to make an announcement, perhaps in conjunction with Obama.
But on Friday morning, Wen declined to attend the "group" negotiations with other heads of state, including Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, etc. This was simply shocking! What were the Chinese doing?!? Obama reportedly went to negotiate with Wen on a bilateral basis afterwards, and a US official said that the talks were "constructive" and "made progress." (By the way, is this standard operating procedure at the State Department? To always say that the talks are making progress, even if they are rocky, in order to encourage greater cooperation?) We all held onto hope for a last-minute breakthrough. (In any case, according to media filings and e-mail updates from the one Stanford individual who got into the Bella Center, things were at a standstill in the plenaries, so it was really up to the U.S. and China.)
Then came the end. After the mad dashing about by world leaders on Friday, what we had was the weak agreement -- so far from all expectations that it was nearly a failure. Comedic, really, when you consider that Obama had to barge into a meeting between China, Brazil, India and S. Africa to get it done. (Okay, apparently he did not "barge" per se, but his presence was not exactly planned.)
I was exiting the Copenhagen Central Station, and I remember looking up at the news ticker and seeing the line "Obama and Wen are in a meeting." Shortly thereafter, at the hotel I had just checked into that day, I turned on CNN. They said that Obama had met with Brazil, China, India and S. Africa and an announcement was imminent. He was consulting with the EU and others, and once that meeting concluded, a press conference would start.
It was very ironic, because I saw the Obama announcement of the "breakthrough" before most of the delegates in Bella Center, because he had pre-recorded his remarks after wrapping things up in the small group meeting, and then left for D.C. I had the UNFCCC webcast open, and the reporters were all still sitting around waiting for the announcement, while CNN was already playing the tape of Obama's recorded speech. I can see why some of the delegates from small nations were livid -- they hadn't been consulted about this "Copenhagen Accord". It had been negotiated by a small group of countries, and now it was tossed on them and they were expected to agree to it!
On the plane ride home from Copenhagen, I sat next to a Fijian observer with links to her country's delegation, who was actually present in the Bella Center for the last two days. She was furious at the turn of events and at the oh-so-weak "agreement" (you could hear the " " quotation marks when she spoke about it, ha ha =D). She was deeply frustrated by the COP process and the UN bureaucracy, disappointed with Obama and what he brought to Copenhagen, angry at Nasheed of the Maldives for buying into the final "agreement".
As we discussed what transpired in Copenhagen, it suddenly dawned on us what the Chinese had been up to. More explanation is needed, but in short, we simply asked ourselves the questions: "What were the incentives for China to act? What motivated the Chinese?"
They were already committed to reducing carbon intensity -- this was going to happen, whatever the outcome at Copenhagen. Then in the first week, the U.S. pretty much eliminated any possibility for funding for China. (The Chinese were quite angry about this statement. This is when they called Todd Stern "extremely irresponsible" and lacking in "common sense", ha ha ha.)
So the choices for China were to:
1) Help usher in a climate deal and avoid being painted as a bad guy who blocked a deal; or
2) Flex its muscle and show the nation's status as a rising power. Demonstrate that the rest of the world needs China on board.
Apparently, they chose option 2. It was a warning shot to the U.S. that in this and future endeavors, Washington will require Beijing's help. We must take their views into consideration. It continues a trend where the Chinese are gaining confidence and saying to the West, "We will not be dictated to." As the Fijian put it, "They were never here to play ball." Instead, they were in Copenhagen to make a statement.
To put it another way, what would have been more valuable for the Chinese? To gain a gold star and international plaudits as a "cooperative player" in the global effort to fight climate change? Or to send an unmistakable signal to the Americans that China has arrived on the world stage and will no longer remain compliant -- and more importantly, that it now has the power to back up that approach? (And in the process, embolden Brazil, South Africa and India to also take a stand.)
One reading of this turn of events: For some time, China has wanted to be seen as a global leader. And it's starting to seem as if they don't envision their role as a soft consensus builder, bridging the developed and developing world. All the talk about "peaceful rise" and "responsible stakeholder" not withstanding, they want to be a robust and independent foreign policy actor. Their "core" national interests -- whatever they define them as, whether it's something as small as sovereignty and verification, or as serious as China's claim over Xinjiang -- are hard constraints that must be taken into account as such. These constraints can't be pressured away or bought off. And in the end, China didn't risk much at Copenhagen to send this message.
Indeed, by the end of the week, I don't think they really cared much about their own international reputation; things were so muddy that blame could easily be tilted anywhere. It becomes a he-said, she-said, and frankly, the U.S. does not have much credibility in this fight, especially because the Chinese had made a commitment before Copenhagen.
And what about jumping ship at the last day, abandoning the united bloc of the G-77? The G-77 + China had actually shown fractures throughout the conference, because some of the small island nations wanted stricter targets an stronger commitments from even the larger developing nations. But China had also consistently sought greater inclusion of developing countries in the negotiation process. Well, to put it another way, the Chinese used this as a reason to slow or block progress, and did not agree to things like smaller group negotiations. Yet on the last day, at the very end of the conference, the Chinese did not hesitate to drop the "all developing countries must participate" banner and take part in the closed-door negotiations to work out the final agreement. The Chinese were unmistakably a linchpin in the group of countries that worked to finalize the Accords -- basically, G-20 plus some additional developing nation representatives -- and the critical role they would have to play in any deal was clear. I suspect you could feel the smug satisfaction radiating from the Chinese. This I think is the real prize that they captured.
The Chinese held all the cards. They didn't need us; we needed them! It honestly did not matter if a strong or a weak agreement was reached at Copenhagen. They had a unilateral carbon intensity goal they set out to do voluntarily (and they will follow through because it makes their industry more competitive! It's something they want). That's all that was on the table for them. Once the funding went away, there wasn't much else the Americans could give to sway them to do more; the Americans didn't really have anything they wanted. (Even if Obama wanted to make more cuts, he couldn't outrun Congress. And whatever amount of funding the West decided to give to the developing countries for adaptation and mitigation, it could always be spun as a shortcoming on the part of the developed world. 跟中国无关). Furthermore, as public opinion has it, the Chinese don't have to do more -- given "common but differentiated responsibilities" and the Kyoto framework, as a developing country, they really aren't committed to anything. The carbon intensity cuts are a goodwill gesture and it sets them up nicely in the media's narrative on what happened at Copenhagen.
The Fijian lady considered MRV an excuse for China to obstruct, not a legitimate reason. And given the possibility for reaching agreement on that issue, I am now inclined to agree. It was a justification for holding up an agreement, not a deep and abiding concern. If they had wanted to, there were many ways out of that thicket.
So if you look at their incentives for reaching an agreement and what plausible goals the Chinese might have had, climate was never a paramount interest. My main mistake -- one also committed by others -- was deluding myself into thinking that "stopping climate change" was their priority, rather than understanding how they were driven by considerations of national interest that lie outside the realm of energy, the environment or even economics.
In Copenhagen, realism bites back.
Feel free to leave remarks or give your own analysis of what happened.
How could this have happened? With mild hopes and expectations seemingly tempered by past experience and current conditions, COP15 was set to achieve a "politically binding" agreement, with a COP15.5 next year to finalize details. Why was the outcome so far from what all parties had been expecting?
I analyze here the role China may have had in these negotiations. It was only on Sunday, after chatting with Yue Li, and then in discussion with a Fijian conference participant on the plane to Frankfurt on Monday, that the terrible realization of what China was up to dawned on me. When I arrived in Calgary, the BBC was reporting Milliband's piece in the Guardian and China's response. Then the next day, a former professor sent me this article discussing how the Chinese delegation behaved, and it was a sad confirmation.
Many of us made the mistake of assuming they had made climate change a priority; we bought into the narrative that "China is greening. The country is doing everything it can to fight climate change, which China itself is vulnerable to. However, it does face certain economic constraints and developmental priorities, which are not unreasonable." We should have realized that, behind the scenes, other forces may have been motivating the Chinese.
Things looked a lot better going into COP15, especially when Beijing announced its carbon intensity commitment back in November. It was a catalyst for India, Brazil and South Africa to follow suit, and it set a positive tone for the negotiations. Though the targets were unambitious, most people thought these represented a starting point for the negotiations -- much as the EU had said 20% reductions were committed, and they would raise it to 30% if a meaningful agreement could be reached. India explicitly stated that its goal (20-25% reduction in carbon intensity) was only a starting point, and it might do more if an “equitable” agreement could be reached. Unfortunately, rather than a starting point for bargaining, the Chinese offer turned out to be the final asking price.
Tack onto that Obama's visit to Beijing in November, and the fact that he changed his arrival in Copenhagen from Dec. 9, the beginning of the conference, to Dec. 18, the last day, and it seemed like something had to have happened behind the scenes that gave the Administration confidence a deal could be reached -- at least enough of a possibility of agreement to risk putting the President's prestige on the line. The fact that 120+ other leaders would be in Copenhagen created a sense of mild optimism for a meaningful outcome. I kept tamping down my expectations in the weeks leading up to COP, but hope still existed.
It was difficult to tell what the Chinese strategy was over the first week and a half in Copenhagen. It really seemed like it could have gone either way. The first week, they were fully in line with the G-77, which was making hard demands. (No more than 1.5 degrees of warming, a lot more funding, deeper emissions cuts from developed countries, etc.) But by all accounts, countries nearly always start off stretching the bounds of what's likely or possible, and give way only later on in the negotiations, with incentives and deals and compromises.
Sadly, compromise was not forthcoming, and progress was very slow. Nations were still very far apart heading into the second week of negotiations. By Tuesday, the second week of the COP, the Chinese were still spouting the hard line "blame the US and the West" rhetoric at their evening press briefing (which took place at 5 PM at their delegation offices, in a little couch area and an adjoining press conference room dubbed the "China Information and Communication Center 中国新闻与交流中心"). Things did not look good ... yet I continued to wonder if this was simply a negotiating tactic, to extract more concessions from the West. No one was truly countenancing failure. In the meantime, much of the rhetoric was coming from the G77 + China bloc, not only China per se, so it was hard to pin it on them. (G77 efforts really seemed well-coordinated, at least on the PR front. You had islands noisily protesting with the help of NGOs; you had G77 spokesperson Lumumba di-Aping of Sudan making dramatic pronouncements about the culpability of developed nations; and you had China, India and others backing them up in a united front.)
On Wednesday, with only 3 days left, we were hoping for the best, but I had a bad, bad feeling that the COP would end without agreement. Throughout the day, I kept turning to my friends and saying, "I hope COP doesn't fail. It would be horrible if things just imploded." It was starting to seem a distinct possibility.
No positive news came out of Bella Center that day. (There was restricted entry, so the Stanford delegation was taking turns getting in with secondary passes. I was in downtown Copenhagen for the afternoon -- the first time I had seen sunlight in several days -- but then the Bella Center stopped NGOs from exiting/entering around 2 p.m., so I wasn't able to make it back in for the 5 p.m. Chinese briefing. However, my friend went to a different briefing by the Finance Minister, and she reported similar rhetoric, specifically on MRV.)
On Thursday morning, things looked absolutely dire -- media were reporting that the Danes were admitting the likelihood of failure, and the Chinese were saying that only a "short political statement" could be expected. But then Secretary Clinton gave her $100 billion in funding speech, and hope was reignited. I spoke to some people familiar with how China operates at these international negotiations, and was told that now the Americans had taken action, had offered something, the door was open to a deal. (I wrote a posting about this here: http://copenhagentime.
MRV (measurement, reporting, verification), the major sticking point, wouldn't have to be intrusive; verification strategies could be devised that were acceptable to all parties -- measures that would respect China's sovereignty, but give enough confidence to the Americans (especially the Senate) that the Chinese were living up to their end of the deal. At that point, it was up to the Chinese to reciprocate: things looked more optimistic, and the stage was set for a potential deal. There was even talk of greater "flexibility" by the Chinese, and media reports transmitted this revived hope.
I kept thinking that with the arrival of Wen Jiabao, the Chinese would suddenly change their tune, at least behind closed doors. The Chinese wouldn't want to be spoilers (or at least wouldn't want to be seen as spoilers), and they were simply waiting for an appropriate moment to make an announcement, perhaps in conjunction with Obama.
But on Friday morning, Wen declined to attend the "group" negotiations with other heads of state, including Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, etc. This was simply shocking! What were the Chinese doing?!? Obama reportedly went to negotiate with Wen on a bilateral basis afterwards, and a US official said that the talks were "constructive" and "made progress." (By the way, is this standard operating procedure at the State Department? To always say that the talks are making progress, even if they are rocky, in order to encourage greater cooperation?) We all held onto hope for a last-minute breakthrough. (In any case, according to media filings and e-mail updates from the one Stanford individual who got into the Bella Center, things were at a standstill in the plenaries, so it was really up to the U.S. and China.)
Then came the end. After the mad dashing about by world leaders on Friday, what we had was the weak agreement -- so far from all expectations that it was nearly a failure. Comedic, really, when you consider that Obama had to barge into a meeting between China, Brazil, India and S. Africa to get it done. (Okay, apparently he did not "barge" per se, but his presence was not exactly planned.)
I was exiting the Copenhagen Central Station, and I remember looking up at the news ticker and seeing the line "Obama and Wen are in a meeting." Shortly thereafter, at the hotel I had just checked into that day, I turned on CNN. They said that Obama had met with Brazil, China, India and S. Africa and an announcement was imminent. He was consulting with the EU and others, and once that meeting concluded, a press conference would start.
It was very ironic, because I saw the Obama announcement of the "breakthrough" before most of the delegates in Bella Center, because he had pre-recorded his remarks after wrapping things up in the small group meeting, and then left for D.C. I had the UNFCCC webcast open, and the reporters were all still sitting around waiting for the announcement, while CNN was already playing the tape of Obama's recorded speech. I can see why some of the delegates from small nations were livid -- they hadn't been consulted about this "Copenhagen Accord". It had been negotiated by a small group of countries, and now it was tossed on them and they were expected to agree to it!
On the plane ride home from Copenhagen, I sat next to a Fijian observer with links to her country's delegation, who was actually present in the Bella Center for the last two days. She was furious at the turn of events and at the oh-so-weak "agreement" (you could hear the " " quotation marks when she spoke about it, ha ha =D). She was deeply frustrated by the COP process and the UN bureaucracy, disappointed with Obama and what he brought to Copenhagen, angry at Nasheed of the Maldives for buying into the final "agreement".
As we discussed what transpired in Copenhagen, it suddenly dawned on us what the Chinese had been up to. More explanation is needed, but in short, we simply asked ourselves the questions: "What were the incentives for China to act? What motivated the Chinese?"
They were already committed to reducing carbon intensity -- this was going to happen, whatever the outcome at Copenhagen. Then in the first week, the U.S. pretty much eliminated any possibility for funding for China. (The Chinese were quite angry about this statement. This is when they called Todd Stern "extremely irresponsible" and lacking in "common sense", ha ha ha.)
So the choices for China were to:
1) Help usher in a climate deal and avoid being painted as a bad guy who blocked a deal; or
2) Flex its muscle and show the nation's status as a rising power. Demonstrate that the rest of the world needs China on board.
Apparently, they chose option 2. It was a warning shot to the U.S. that in this and future endeavors, Washington will require Beijing's help. We must take their views into consideration. It continues a trend where the Chinese are gaining confidence and saying to the West, "We will not be dictated to." As the Fijian put it, "They were never here to play ball." Instead, they were in Copenhagen to make a statement.
To put it another way, what would have been more valuable for the Chinese? To gain a gold star and international plaudits as a "cooperative player" in the global effort to fight climate change? Or to send an unmistakable signal to the Americans that China has arrived on the world stage and will no longer remain compliant -- and more importantly, that it now has the power to back up that approach? (And in the process, embolden Brazil, South Africa and India to also take a stand.)
One reading of this turn of events: For some time, China has wanted to be seen as a global leader. And it's starting to seem as if they don't envision their role as a soft consensus builder, bridging the developed and developing world. All the talk about "peaceful rise" and "responsible stakeholder" not withstanding, they want to be a robust and independent foreign policy actor. Their "core" national interests -- whatever they define them as, whether it's something as small as sovereignty and verification, or as serious as China's claim over Xinjiang -- are hard constraints that must be taken into account as such. These constraints can't be pressured away or bought off. And in the end, China didn't risk much at Copenhagen to send this message.
Indeed, by the end of the week, I don't think they really cared much about their own international reputation; things were so muddy that blame could easily be tilted anywhere. It becomes a he-said, she-said, and frankly, the U.S. does not have much credibility in this fight, especially because the Chinese had made a commitment before Copenhagen.
And what about jumping ship at the last day, abandoning the united bloc of the G-77? The G-77 + China had actually shown fractures throughout the conference, because some of the small island nations wanted stricter targets an stronger commitments from even the larger developing nations. But China had also consistently sought greater inclusion of developing countries in the negotiation process. Well, to put it another way, the Chinese used this as a reason to slow or block progress, and did not agree to things like smaller group negotiations. Yet on the last day, at the very end of the conference, the Chinese did not hesitate to drop the "all developing countries must participate" banner and take part in the closed-door negotiations to work out the final agreement. The Chinese were unmistakably a linchpin in the group of countries that worked to finalize the Accords -- basically, G-20 plus some additional developing nation representatives -- and the critical role they would have to play in any deal was clear. I suspect you could feel the smug satisfaction radiating from the Chinese. This I think is the real prize that they captured.
The Chinese held all the cards. They didn't need us; we needed them! It honestly did not matter if a strong or a weak agreement was reached at Copenhagen. They had a unilateral carbon intensity goal they set out to do voluntarily (and they will follow through because it makes their industry more competitive! It's something they want). That's all that was on the table for them. Once the funding went away, there wasn't much else the Americans could give to sway them to do more; the Americans didn't really have anything they wanted. (Even if Obama wanted to make more cuts, he couldn't outrun Congress. And whatever amount of funding the West decided to give to the developing countries for adaptation and mitigation, it could always be spun as a shortcoming on the part of the developed world. 跟中国无关). Furthermore, as public opinion has it, the Chinese don't have to do more -- given "common but differentiated responsibilities" and the Kyoto framework, as a developing country, they really aren't committed to anything. The carbon intensity cuts are a goodwill gesture and it sets them up nicely in the media's narrative on what happened at Copenhagen.
The Fijian lady considered MRV an excuse for China to obstruct, not a legitimate reason. And given the possibility for reaching agreement on that issue, I am now inclined to agree. It was a justification for holding up an agreement, not a deep and abiding concern. If they had wanted to, there were many ways out of that thicket.
So if you look at their incentives for reaching an agreement and what plausible goals the Chinese might have had, climate was never a paramount interest. My main mistake -- one also committed by others -- was deluding myself into thinking that "stopping climate change" was their priority, rather than understanding how they were driven by considerations of national interest that lie outside the realm of energy, the environment or even economics.
In Copenhagen, realism bites back.
Feel free to leave remarks or give your own analysis of what happened.
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Back home!
Major brain disconnect: blue sky and golden sunshine?!? How can it be?
Such confusion in my mind, after two weeks of winter & (admittedly nice) snow...
Now I can't stop smiling!
Irresponsible. And realism bites back.
Just a few days ago, my own feelings were that the Chinese had not been particularly uncooperative, but still gave them some credence, as the United States itself is not a paragon of climate virtue. I was still disappointed in the outcome at Copenhagen, though.
Then on the airplane, speaking with a person from Fiji who was in Bella Center the last two days, I suddenly realized that there was no incentive for the Chinese to have a deal come through. Either way, they were going to unilaterally do the carbon intensity cuts. The question is, what message did they hope to send with the talks? 1) "We care about the climate and are a cooperative partner" or 2) "We are a big country to be reckoned with now"?
The Fijian and I had suspicions it might actually be the latter, and when we examined China's interests and incentives, we realized that the Chinese didn't really have much at stake if no deal arose. The funding hopes were cut off pretty cleanly in the first week, and the Chinese admitted as much. So there wasn't much left for the Chinese to bargain with; posturing, support for the G77 and developing nation agenda (i.e. bloc leadership) could be the name of the game. Then when the heads of state started arriving, their role as a broker and make-or-break linchpin became apparent.
As she put it, they were "not here to play ball." Any negative publicity would be outweighed by the rise in national stature -- or at least at least in an equivalent message delivered behind the scenes.
Now we find out from someone who was there first hand what had happened ... this is just horrible. China's role ... confirmed! Grrrr!!!
http://www.guardian.co.uk/More to come.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Oh China
This was all over the BBC last night.
The talks were chaotic, at times farcical. But in the accord there were real gains we can build upon
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/20/copenhagen-climate-change-accord
China Defends Climate Talk Stance (Associated Press)
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/12/22/world/AP-AS-China-Britain-Climate.html
China says Britain sowing discord in climate politics (Reuters)
http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINTOE5BL03020091222
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/20/copenhagen-climate-change-accord
Britain blames China for climate talks' failure (Reuters)
http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE5BK1H0.htm
http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE5BK1H0.htm
--- vs. ---
China Defends Climate Talk Stance (Associated Press)
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/12/22/world/AP-AS-China-Britain-Climate.html
China says Britain sowing discord in climate politics (Reuters)
http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINTOE5BL03020091222
The adventure continues
Well, I thought the layover in Frankfurt would be the last of winter I would have to see. I expected to be back in lovely, temperate California by now. The Air Canada flight out from Frankfurt was delayed for de-icing. I napped while this was going on, so I assumed it would take 10 minutes, like it did at Copenhagen. Apparently the flight was actually delayed for 2 hours, so by the time we arrived at Calgary, it was already past six.
We waited in a loooong line at customs. Then I had to pick up my suitcase from the baggage claim, and then recheck it and get a boarding pass. Unfortunately, it was already nearly 7 when I got through customs, and the bag never showed up, and the flight was leaving at 7:14, and it was just a big mess.
Air Canada really needs to revamp its baggage handling system. They kept dumping out all these suitcases that sat in piles two or three high on the carousel, that nobody was claiming. Everyone already present didn't see their bags for the longest time. (Or in my case, at all). I would have just gone through to my connecting flight, but they said we were not supposed to leave without our bags.
Eventually, I had to go to the lost baggage counter. It was already past 7:30, and the SF-bound flight had already left. Unfortunately, I found out it was the last flight of the day. (In any case, the US customs gate had also closed at 7 pm, so it was unlikely that I could have gotten through). It turns out lots of Frankfurt bags hadn't arrived (even though we had plenty of time for them to ensure all the luggage got on board in Germany). Since my final flight is to SFO, I am supposed to file the missing bag form once I arrive in San Francisco. It would have been nice for them to tell us earlier; I would have just gotten on the flight for home.
Anyhow, I am booked for an 8 a.m. flight to SF. (I am supposed to show up at 6 a.m. ... and no, that's no longer considered arriving early, lol.) I guess I will have to spend another 12 hours away from home. So there's another story for the stack that is this Copenhagen Adventure.
I suppose in a way I now get to commiserate with all the people trapped on the East Coast, in Europe, between UK and France, by air or rail or bus, as they seek to get to their December destinations.
The islands speak again
Met a girl from Fiji who was also on the Copenhagen to Frankfurt flight. She was working at COP with 350. She was disappointed and angry, and was losing faith in the UN. (I gave her the line about the UN being a collection of member states, so it was really the member states she should be angry with.)
Some of her thoughts:
- Weak agreement
- Completely under the control of the "umbrella group" i.e. G-20 -- other countries had no input
- Nasheed (of the Maldives) signed on! She was really mad at him for that.
- (I tried to reason that he wanted to keep the UNFCCC process together, that if he and other SIS had just abandoned it, the conference could have ended in outright failure. She said that he could have made a speech about how he was being forced to sign on, given the exigencies of the situation, but that he was not happy about it. Instead, he was highly supportive).
- Weak performance by the U.S. Disappointed in Obama. (We discussed Congress' role, how the US is not a parliamentary system, not a majoritarian system with good party discipline, so how the Senate goes is absolutely pivotal, and not guaranteed even though there is a Democratic majority in both houses of Congress.)
- China's obstructionist behaviors. Major revelatory moment here.
- Should we have a COP16 or not? Better or worse for UNFCCC to fail? (I pointed out that without UNFCCC, island nations and small countries have no say, it would just be G-20 dictating terms. At least there are some mechanisms for participation in UNFCCC)
- Funding ambiguous. ($100 billion in the Clinton speech. But public/private sources? Alternative sources? It's really unclear what all this means. The Fijian was also worried about how much will be from existing aid vs. new aid.)
- The whole "accord" is ambiguous. Not only non-committal, but even what it says is open to interpretation and not very clear.
- The outcome was way worse than anyone had anticipated. Have to go back to the drawing board and see where we go from here.
CPH
Trained to the airport this morning. Goodbye, Copenhagen!
- Efficient! There was a massive line reaching around the corner, but in about 20 minutes, we were already checking in.
- The Danes are lovely people. They have trust in others and are open and kind, even to strangers.
Sunday, December 20, 2009
Musician stirring ...
I spent today walking around downtown Copenhagen, from the Main Square through Norreport's shops and cafes, to the Amalienborg Palace (which was lovely in its symmetry and with an unpretentious-but-noble presence), to the King's Garden (snowed in) and Rosenborg Castle (stiff, and mostly filled with jewels, which for some reason was singularly unexciting. As the person manning the store put it, it's a storage attic).
The last destination I had in mind for the walking tour was the Fortification next to Osterport station. It was getting dark, and I decided not to venture into the big snowy park across what looked like a frozen moat. Instead, I walked down Esplanade/Brodegade back toward the center of town.
The last destination I had in mind for the walking tour was the Fortification next to Osterport station. It was getting dark, and I decided not to venture into the big snowy park across what looked like a frozen moat. Instead, I walked down Esplanade/Brodegade back toward the center of town.
By happenstance, the road passed by the domed building I had seen earlier from the plaza at Amalienborg Palace. On the map, it was called the Marble Church, and I decided to take one more look around. I crossed over to ( ) street, which had festive holiday lights strung across and strolled through the winter night. I arrived at the church and took a few photos of the exterior, turquoise oxidized copper against a twilight sky. As I circled around the edge and prepared to walk home, I glanced in the window and caught a glimpse of an exquisite interior. Amber had mentioned the other day that she always liked to see the insides of churches, simply for the aesthetics -- so I decided to give this one a try.
At the front door, there was a sign that said, "no sightseeing." Apparently the doors were closed for an ongoing "koncert." I glanced at the program posted on the wall, which looked awesome -- my eyes focused on the words J.S. Bach -- and at once decided to stay.
As soon as I walked inside, I could hear strings floating across the room. I tiptoed to a pew and sat down, relaxing into the blanket of sound. The music swelled, and it was absolutely rapturous ... that moment ... you musicians know what I mean, the feeling you get when the music crests into a wave of harmony and togetherness, carrying a particular emotive force ... The sound was stunning, enveloping the audience in its brilliant and lovely timbre. I could have stayed in place for hours, with swimming acoustics that reverberated and bathed you in beauty and light. The scene ... the high rounded dome, soft golden illumination, saints and angels in shining garb standing in 12 panels around the heavens ...
The chamber orchestra played through Tchaikovsky's Serenade for Strings, and I do not know if I was awake or dreaming in that world awash in beauty and sound. I felt fortunate to be allowed this perfect moment on a winter night.
Sigh(s)
Depressing post from the BBC's Richard Black on the implications of the, uh, "Copenhagen Accord" on climate change negotiations; the way collective action will be manifested; and the future of the UNFCCC as a mechanism for international coordination. Some key points:
What appears to have happened is that the UN process was effectively ambushed by countries that perhaps don't want there to be a UN process....
Intriguingly, the morning after the deal was announced by White House press release, it wasn't clear whether it counts as an agreement within the UN system or whether it lies outside. If parties had adopted the deal, it would be a UN issue. But they didn't, because there was no consensus; instead governments only decided to "take note" of the accord.
...
During their discussions afterwards, several delegations suggested this means it isn't a UN agreement - and various UN officials gave different interpretations. If it turns out not to be a UN agreement, then - at the extreme end of things - the UN climate convention could effectively be dead as the powerful world's favoured instrument for controlling emissions. A deal made at a UN summit would move outside, being a free-standing arrangement effectively decided by the 26 countries involved in the drafting. It will mean that a select group of countries - the G20, or thereabouts - will basically decide what they want to do, and then do it.
...
Does Copenhagen, then, mark not the beginning of a new global climate regime but the end of the vision of global, negotiated climate governance? Is it the end for the idea of global, negotiated governance on other environmental issues?
Maybe this post should be called "Collective Sighs Post-COP15". I'm really interested in seeing where this issue of environmental governance and international environmental regimes go ... We should ask Wara or Weyant when we get back to Stanford.
Saturday, December 19, 2009
Collateral Damage - REDD goes under?
Lack of a final deal means other issues in the climate talks, such as REDD, may also be casualties -- even though there was substantial support and agreement for these parts of a deal. I don't follow REDD closely (you should check with Matt Colgan, one of my roommates here in Copenhagen, who has been sticking with it through the whole COP) -- but it was one of the bright spots in the whole process. It would be a tragedy if it sank with the foundering "comprehensive" agreement.
I became worried when I saw this article:
Forest Plan Gets Ax at UN Climate Talks (Dec 19, 2009)
By Michael Casey, The Associated Press
COPENHAGEN -- A plan to protect the world's biologically rich tropical forests was shelved early Saturday after world leaders failed to agree on a binding deal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Delegates scrapped plans for a comprehensive climate agreement that would have included the deal to pay poor countries to protect their forests. The program is known as REDD for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation.
''REDD gets punted along for another year,'' said Kevin Conrad, executive director of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, which includes many of the 40 tropical countries that would take part in the program. ''It's depressing,'' he said. ''It means I've got to spend another year ... coming to meetings and talking about the same things.''
The burning or cutting of trees for logging and to clear land for plantations or cattle ranches is blamed for about 20 percent of global emissions. That's as much carbon dioxide as all the world's cars, trucks, trains, planes and ships combined. About 32 million acres (13 million hectares) of forests are cut down each year -- an area about the size of England or New York State -- and the emissions generated are comparable to those of China and the United States, according to the Eliasch Review. Deforestation for logging, cattle grazing and crops has made Indonesia and Brazil the world's third- and fourth-biggest emitters.
''The failure of the U.N. process to agree on a system to fund and regulate the protection of the world's forests means that business as usual logging and forest conversion will continue,'' said Stephen Leonard of the Australian Orangutan Project. ''No treaty means that forest destruction will continue unabated, forest dependent peoples rights will not be protected and endangered species will continue down the path to extinction.''
REDD would be financed either by wealthy nations or by a carbon-trading mechanism -- a system in which each country would have an emissions ceiling, allowing those who undershoot it to sell their emissions credits to over-polluters.
---
UPDATE 1: Karim says it is still on the final draft, so hopefully the program can still be created/effectively implemented.
UPDATE 2 (12/20/09): One paragraph regarding REDD-plus is included in the final Copenhagen Accord. Two other points on REDD were not included.
P.S. REDD-plus is what we call India's provision to pay countries for enhancing carbon stocks (by planting trees), in addition to preventing deforestation.
Wall Street Journal -- editorial nonsense?
Saturday, Dec. 19. Around 8 a.m. I will get to my emotions regarding this COP in another post. For now, I just want to respond to some of the drivel that's coming out in the American media.
This morning, The Wall Street Journal printed an editorial called "Copenhagen's Lesson in Limits". I'm not in an overly joyful mood, and the editorial board is testing my patience with their flippant and dismissive wave of the hand at COP and the efforts by all the delegates. If you read the piece,it is misleading and contains serious inaccuracies. It's not a meaningful commentary, just a political potshot that makes claims without a factual basis. There are major problems with the editorial because it trades accuracy for glib one-liners. Though rhetorically clever, the one-liners are still wrong--sorry, you don't get points for extra snarkiness.
This morning, The Wall Street Journal printed an editorial called "Copenhagen's Lesson in Limits". I'm not in an overly joyful mood, and the editorial board is testing my patience with their flippant and dismissive wave of the hand at COP and the efforts by all the delegates. If you read the piece,it is misleading and contains serious inaccuracies. It's not a meaningful commentary, just a political potshot that makes claims without a factual basis. There are major problems with the editorial because it trades accuracy for glib one-liners. Though rhetorically clever, the one-liners are still wrong--sorry, you don't get points for extra snarkiness.
Coming from an editorial board that revels in "debunking" climate change and excoriating all manner of efforts to combat global warming's harmful impacts, I shouldn't have expected any better -- they never wished the COP success anyway. However, it's still annoying to hear such derision, right when everyone's hopes were for a good outcome.
Several lines in this article struck me as particularly erroneous. They were pronouncements made from the armchair, rather than with a view of the negotiating floor. For example:
We can't wait to hear Mr. Obama tell Americans that he wants them to pay higher taxes so the U.S. can pay China to become more energy efficient and thus more economically competitive.
What is the WSJ talking about? This is just ludicrous.
1) Pricing carbon is a way for AMERICA to get more energy efficient and competitive. If our industries are inefficient and polluting, instead of continuing to subsidize dirty, inefficient production by feeding cheap coal or electricity generated by fossil fuel, putting a price on carbon (via tax or permits, you choose) is a way to encourage industry to get leaner and more energy efficient. Carbon intensity in the US has slowly trended downward in the past half century. Let's accelerate the transformation and develop cleaner, greener jobs. Furthermore, in addition to ramping up efficiency of our manufacturing, the US should be getting into a leadership position on clean technology and developing innovative new industries.
2) China is most likely not even going to get funding from the United States; the primary recipients of assistance are the LDCs and other “nations that are the most vulnerable and least prepared to meet the effects of climate change,” as Secretary of State Clinton said. The American delegation was pretty clear on this throughout the COP15 negotiations. Head of delegation, Special Envoy on Climate Change Todd Stern also said earlier, "I do not envision public funds, certainly not from the US, going to China. We would intend to direct our public funds to the neediest countries." (Also quoted here.) He noted "China -- to its great credit -- has a dynamic economy, and sits on some two trillion dollars in reserves. So we don’t think China would be the first candidate for public funding."
(The Chinese were extremely unhappy about this statement, and Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei blasted Stern for it, claiming he "lacked common sense" or was "extremely irresponsible." However, they eventually admitted that things would probably play out this way and agreed that funds should be focused on the neediest countries. See FT Times articles here and here and a clarification by the foreign ministry.)
3) Rather than foreign aid, China is more likely to receive international funds by participating in a carbon market. This shouldn't be a problem because the Wall Street Journal loves markets and market-based mechanisms, right? One such mechanism, the CDM, has its problems, but projects in China are coming under increasing scrutiny, with several Chinese projects rejected.
4) In any case (THIS IS A KEY POINT!), China has already stated its intention to move ahead unilaterally with its carbon intensity target, regardless of the outcome at Copenhagen. Chinese industry doesn’t need U.S. funding to retool and get even more competitive. Increasing efficiency is a smart economic move, so industry and government are willing to act of their own volition. As Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei said at a press conference: “Our commitment from now to 2020 is pledged on the basis of no external funds. It's a unilateral action." Premiere Wen Jiabao noted that China "will fulfill it regardless of the outcome of the Copenhagen climate talks." So America’s money is safe for now. We don't have to "pay" the Chinese to do this; they are committed to doing it because they realize efficiency boosts competitiveness!
In any case, China may not even desire U.S. aid, because it would come with MRV stipulations, which they’ve been somewhat allergic to throughout the negotiations.
5) Some funding will be used for mitigation activities like efficiency improvements, but much of the funding is designated for adaptation and forest preservation. Again, see Clinton's speech at COP15 on Thursday, Dec. 17.
6) As Thomas Friedman said on the CNN+YouTube debate on Wednesday, "WE'RE ALREADY PAYING A TAX!"
(Watch the clip at http://www.youtube.com/watc
(UPDATE 12-24-09) The YouTube clip no longer seems to be accessible, so check this one out instead, around 26:20)
We are funneling money to all manner of authoritarian regimes overseas that don't like us very much because of our addiction to fossil fuels. So in terms of taxes, “We're already paying one; it's just a matter of which treasury it goes to.” Friedman says he'd prefer “paying it to our own American treasury, to fund U.S. schools, U.S. hospitals, U.S. roads, U.S. research,” as opposed to unfriendly governments.
-----
Another paragraph in the editorial that is extremely problematic:
No doubt under the agreement China will continue to get a free climate pass despite its role as the world's No. 1 emitter. At Copenhagen the emerging economies nonetheless proved skilled at exploiting the West's carbon Tguilt, and in exchange for the nonconcession of continuing to negotiate next year, or the year after that, they'll receive up to $100 billion in foreign aid by 2020, with the U.S. contributing the lion's share.
1) What a double standard. For the longest time, the United States ALWAYS got a free climate pass "despite its role as the world's No. 1 emitter." Even today, we aren't covered by the Kyoto Protocol because we refused to ratify it!Thus, while virtually every other developed economy has emissions targets, we have no commitments under Kyoto. This is why there was a scramble at COP15 to find a way for the US to make commitments to reduce emissions outside the KP track, while the rest of the Annex I countries made commitments in an extension of Kyoto.
2) "Carbon guilt"?
Uh ... if you were even paying attention to the negotiations, the US delegation repeatedly insisted that the funding was NOT for reparations, but for assistance. The head negotiator for the U.S. categorically rejected the notion of carbon guilt. (Indeed, this position was a source of tension and angered other delegations, since they thought the West should not only take on more historical responsibility, but pay for it.)
LINK: U.S. sees robust climate talks, no "reparations"
http://www.reuters.com/article
3) Aid of $100 billion through 2020
Er... what's wrong with that? The low-lying coastal countries, small-island states, and LDCs are the most vulnerable to the damage caused by climate change. We are essentially screwing them over with our refusal to curb our emissions. This money is for help with adaptation, as well as mitigation and forest management. So yes, they should be getting this money, because they face substantial harm as we continue to pollute and refuse to change our ways. (This is called the “Polluter Pays” principle.). Unfortunately, nature will not be so kind while we dither.
And is the US really going to take up the lion's share? We've been extremely stingy so far, despite having the greatest historical emissions and one of the greatest per capita emissions. The EU has been ponying up a lot more cash. Anyway, rest easy, Wall Street, funding will come from "public and private sources" of finance, so you'll get your cow to milk.
-----
Obstructionists like the WSJ editorial board need to get out of the way and let American industry and society rise up to meet the challenge head-on: to become more efficient; cut emissions and resource usage; and pursue opportunities in new fields. The SAME OLD WAY is unsustainable and headed for failure. Why do we want to preside over the old economy of the 20th century when we could be leading the new economy of the 21st? Take it from someone who lives in Silicon Valley; being on the cutting edge and innovating is actually a good thing. I believe in the capacity of people, corporations and institutions all over the United States to join in the renewal of our nation and regain a position of leadership. Fighting efforts to mitigate climate change and spreading misinformation are not helpful to that mission.
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