How could this have happened? With mild hopes and expectations seemingly tempered by past experience and current conditions, COP15 was set to achieve a "politically binding" agreement, with a COP15.5 next year to finalize details. Why was the outcome so far from what all parties had been expecting?
I analyze here the role China may have had in these negotiations. It was only on Sunday, after chatting with Yue Li, and then in discussion with a Fijian conference participant on the plane to Frankfurt on Monday, that the terrible realization of what China was up to dawned on me. When I arrived in Calgary, the BBC was reporting Milliband's piece in the Guardian and China's response. Then the next day, a former professor sent me this article discussing how the Chinese delegation behaved, and it was a sad confirmation.
Many of us made the mistake of assuming they had made climate change a priority; we bought into the narrative that "China is greening. The country is doing everything it can to fight climate change, which China itself is vulnerable to. However, it does face certain economic constraints and developmental priorities, which are not unreasonable." We should have realized that, behind the scenes, other forces may have been motivating the Chinese.
Things looked a lot better going into COP15, especially when Beijing announced its carbon intensity commitment back in November. It was a catalyst for India, Brazil and South Africa to follow suit, and it set a positive tone for the negotiations. Though the targets were unambitious, most people thought these represented a starting point for the negotiations -- much as the EU had said 20% reductions were committed, and they would raise it to 30% if a meaningful agreement could be reached. India explicitly stated that its goal (20-25% reduction in carbon intensity) was only a starting point, and it might do more if an “equitable” agreement could be reached. Unfortunately, rather than a starting point for bargaining, the Chinese offer turned out to be the final asking price.
Tack onto that Obama's visit to Beijing in November, and the fact that he changed his arrival in Copenhagen from Dec. 9, the beginning of the conference, to Dec. 18, the last day, and it seemed like something had to have happened behind the scenes that gave the Administration confidence a deal could be reached -- at least enough of a possibility of agreement to risk putting the President's prestige on the line. The fact that 120+ other leaders would be in Copenhagen created a sense of mild optimism for a meaningful outcome. I kept tamping down my expectations in the weeks leading up to COP, but hope still existed.
It was difficult to tell what the Chinese strategy was over the first week and a half in Copenhagen. It really seemed like it could have gone either way. The first week, they were fully in line with the G-77, which was making hard demands. (No more than 1.5 degrees of warming, a lot more funding, deeper emissions cuts from developed countries, etc.) But by all accounts, countries nearly always start off stretching the bounds of what's likely or possible, and give way only later on in the negotiations, with incentives and deals and compromises.
Sadly, compromise was not forthcoming, and progress was very slow. Nations were still very far apart heading into the second week of negotiations. By Tuesday, the second week of the COP, the Chinese were still spouting the hard line "blame the US and the West" rhetoric at their evening press briefing (which took place at 5 PM at their delegation offices, in a little couch area and an adjoining press conference room dubbed the "China Information and Communication Center 中国新闻与交流中心"). Things did not look good ... yet I continued to wonder if this was simply a negotiating tactic, to extract more concessions from the West. No one was truly countenancing failure. In the meantime, much of the rhetoric was coming from the G77 + China bloc, not only China per se, so it was hard to pin it on them. (G77 efforts really seemed well-coordinated, at least on the PR front. You had islands noisily protesting with the help of NGOs; you had G77 spokesperson Lumumba di-Aping of Sudan making dramatic pronouncements about the culpability of developed nations; and you had China, India and others backing them up in a united front.)
On Wednesday, with only 3 days left, we were hoping for the best, but I had a bad, bad feeling that the COP would end without agreement. Throughout the day, I kept turning to my friends and saying, "I hope COP doesn't fail. It would be horrible if things just imploded." It was starting to seem a distinct possibility.
No positive news came out of Bella Center that day. (There was restricted entry, so the Stanford delegation was taking turns getting in with secondary passes. I was in downtown Copenhagen for the afternoon -- the first time I had seen sunlight in several days -- but then the Bella Center stopped NGOs from exiting/entering around 2 p.m., so I wasn't able to make it back in for the 5 p.m. Chinese briefing. However, my friend went to a different briefing by the Finance Minister, and she reported similar rhetoric, specifically on MRV.)
On Thursday morning, things looked absolutely dire -- media were reporting that the Danes were admitting the likelihood of failure, and the Chinese were saying that only a "short political statement" could be expected. But then Secretary Clinton gave her $100 billion in funding speech, and hope was reignited. I spoke to some people familiar with how China operates at these international negotiations, and was told that now the Americans had taken action, had offered something, the door was open to a deal. (I wrote a posting about this here: http://copenhagentime.
MRV (measurement, reporting, verification), the major sticking point, wouldn't have to be intrusive; verification strategies could be devised that were acceptable to all parties -- measures that would respect China's sovereignty, but give enough confidence to the Americans (especially the Senate) that the Chinese were living up to their end of the deal. At that point, it was up to the Chinese to reciprocate: things looked more optimistic, and the stage was set for a potential deal. There was even talk of greater "flexibility" by the Chinese, and media reports transmitted this revived hope.
I kept thinking that with the arrival of Wen Jiabao, the Chinese would suddenly change their tune, at least behind closed doors. The Chinese wouldn't want to be spoilers (or at least wouldn't want to be seen as spoilers), and they were simply waiting for an appropriate moment to make an announcement, perhaps in conjunction with Obama.
But on Friday morning, Wen declined to attend the "group" negotiations with other heads of state, including Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, etc. This was simply shocking! What were the Chinese doing?!? Obama reportedly went to negotiate with Wen on a bilateral basis afterwards, and a US official said that the talks were "constructive" and "made progress." (By the way, is this standard operating procedure at the State Department? To always say that the talks are making progress, even if they are rocky, in order to encourage greater cooperation?) We all held onto hope for a last-minute breakthrough. (In any case, according to media filings and e-mail updates from the one Stanford individual who got into the Bella Center, things were at a standstill in the plenaries, so it was really up to the U.S. and China.)
Then came the end. After the mad dashing about by world leaders on Friday, what we had was the weak agreement -- so far from all expectations that it was nearly a failure. Comedic, really, when you consider that Obama had to barge into a meeting between China, Brazil, India and S. Africa to get it done. (Okay, apparently he did not "barge" per se, but his presence was not exactly planned.)
I was exiting the Copenhagen Central Station, and I remember looking up at the news ticker and seeing the line "Obama and Wen are in a meeting." Shortly thereafter, at the hotel I had just checked into that day, I turned on CNN. They said that Obama had met with Brazil, China, India and S. Africa and an announcement was imminent. He was consulting with the EU and others, and once that meeting concluded, a press conference would start.
It was very ironic, because I saw the Obama announcement of the "breakthrough" before most of the delegates in Bella Center, because he had pre-recorded his remarks after wrapping things up in the small group meeting, and then left for D.C. I had the UNFCCC webcast open, and the reporters were all still sitting around waiting for the announcement, while CNN was already playing the tape of Obama's recorded speech. I can see why some of the delegates from small nations were livid -- they hadn't been consulted about this "Copenhagen Accord". It had been negotiated by a small group of countries, and now it was tossed on them and they were expected to agree to it!
On the plane ride home from Copenhagen, I sat next to a Fijian observer with links to her country's delegation, who was actually present in the Bella Center for the last two days. She was furious at the turn of events and at the oh-so-weak "agreement" (you could hear the " " quotation marks when she spoke about it, ha ha =D). She was deeply frustrated by the COP process and the UN bureaucracy, disappointed with Obama and what he brought to Copenhagen, angry at Nasheed of the Maldives for buying into the final "agreement".
As we discussed what transpired in Copenhagen, it suddenly dawned on us what the Chinese had been up to. More explanation is needed, but in short, we simply asked ourselves the questions: "What were the incentives for China to act? What motivated the Chinese?"
They were already committed to reducing carbon intensity -- this was going to happen, whatever the outcome at Copenhagen. Then in the first week, the U.S. pretty much eliminated any possibility for funding for China. (The Chinese were quite angry about this statement. This is when they called Todd Stern "extremely irresponsible" and lacking in "common sense", ha ha ha.)
So the choices for China were to:
1) Help usher in a climate deal and avoid being painted as a bad guy who blocked a deal; or
2) Flex its muscle and show the nation's status as a rising power. Demonstrate that the rest of the world needs China on board.
Apparently, they chose option 2. It was a warning shot to the U.S. that in this and future endeavors, Washington will require Beijing's help. We must take their views into consideration. It continues a trend where the Chinese are gaining confidence and saying to the West, "We will not be dictated to." As the Fijian put it, "They were never here to play ball." Instead, they were in Copenhagen to make a statement.
To put it another way, what would have been more valuable for the Chinese? To gain a gold star and international plaudits as a "cooperative player" in the global effort to fight climate change? Or to send an unmistakable signal to the Americans that China has arrived on the world stage and will no longer remain compliant -- and more importantly, that it now has the power to back up that approach? (And in the process, embolden Brazil, South Africa and India to also take a stand.)
One reading of this turn of events: For some time, China has wanted to be seen as a global leader. And it's starting to seem as if they don't envision their role as a soft consensus builder, bridging the developed and developing world. All the talk about "peaceful rise" and "responsible stakeholder" not withstanding, they want to be a robust and independent foreign policy actor. Their "core" national interests -- whatever they define them as, whether it's something as small as sovereignty and verification, or as serious as China's claim over Xinjiang -- are hard constraints that must be taken into account as such. These constraints can't be pressured away or bought off. And in the end, China didn't risk much at Copenhagen to send this message.
Indeed, by the end of the week, I don't think they really cared much about their own international reputation; things were so muddy that blame could easily be tilted anywhere. It becomes a he-said, she-said, and frankly, the U.S. does not have much credibility in this fight, especially because the Chinese had made a commitment before Copenhagen.
And what about jumping ship at the last day, abandoning the united bloc of the G-77? The G-77 + China had actually shown fractures throughout the conference, because some of the small island nations wanted stricter targets an stronger commitments from even the larger developing nations. But China had also consistently sought greater inclusion of developing countries in the negotiation process. Well, to put it another way, the Chinese used this as a reason to slow or block progress, and did not agree to things like smaller group negotiations. Yet on the last day, at the very end of the conference, the Chinese did not hesitate to drop the "all developing countries must participate" banner and take part in the closed-door negotiations to work out the final agreement. The Chinese were unmistakably a linchpin in the group of countries that worked to finalize the Accords -- basically, G-20 plus some additional developing nation representatives -- and the critical role they would have to play in any deal was clear. I suspect you could feel the smug satisfaction radiating from the Chinese. This I think is the real prize that they captured.
The Chinese held all the cards. They didn't need us; we needed them! It honestly did not matter if a strong or a weak agreement was reached at Copenhagen. They had a unilateral carbon intensity goal they set out to do voluntarily (and they will follow through because it makes their industry more competitive! It's something they want). That's all that was on the table for them. Once the funding went away, there wasn't much else the Americans could give to sway them to do more; the Americans didn't really have anything they wanted. (Even if Obama wanted to make more cuts, he couldn't outrun Congress. And whatever amount of funding the West decided to give to the developing countries for adaptation and mitigation, it could always be spun as a shortcoming on the part of the developed world. 跟中国无关). Furthermore, as public opinion has it, the Chinese don't have to do more -- given "common but differentiated responsibilities" and the Kyoto framework, as a developing country, they really aren't committed to anything. The carbon intensity cuts are a goodwill gesture and it sets them up nicely in the media's narrative on what happened at Copenhagen.
The Fijian lady considered MRV an excuse for China to obstruct, not a legitimate reason. And given the possibility for reaching agreement on that issue, I am now inclined to agree. It was a justification for holding up an agreement, not a deep and abiding concern. If they had wanted to, there were many ways out of that thicket.
So if you look at their incentives for reaching an agreement and what plausible goals the Chinese might have had, climate was never a paramount interest. My main mistake -- one also committed by others -- was deluding myself into thinking that "stopping climate change" was their priority, rather than understanding how they were driven by considerations of national interest that lie outside the realm of energy, the environment or even economics.
In Copenhagen, realism bites back.
Feel free to leave remarks or give your own analysis of what happened.
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