At least they're on board ...

Here's how the NY Times puts it:

Climate Goal Is Supported by China and India [!!!]

By JOHN M. BRODER
The New York Times

WASHINGTON — China and India formally agreed Tuesday to join the international climate change agreement reached in December in Copenhagen, the last two major economies to sign up.

The two countries, among the largest and fastest-growing sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the world, submitted letters to the United Nations agreeing to be included on a list of countries covered by the Copenhagen Accord, a three-page nonbinding statement reached at the end of the contentious and chaotic 10-day conference.

China and India join more than 100 countries that have signed up under the accord, which calls for limiting the rise in global temperatures to no more than 2 degrees Celsius, or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit, beyond pre-industrial levels...

The inclusion of China and India has only a minor practical effect but will provide a boost for the agreement’s credibility.
“After careful consideration, India has agreed to such a listing,” Reuters quoted India’s environment minister, Jairam Ramesh, as telling Parliament on Tuesday. “We believe that our decision to be listed reflects the role India played in giving shape to the Copenhagen Accord. This will strengthen our negotiating position on climate change.”

Mr. Ramesh confirmed India’s action in an e-mail message.

India sent a letter on Monday to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the body responsible for international climate negotiations, stating its intent to join the Copenhagen Accord.

China’s chief climate change negotiator, Su Wei, submitted a single-sentence letter saying that the United Nations “can proceed to include China in the list of parties” signed up under the accord.

China has said it will try to voluntarily reduce its emissions of carbon dioxide per unit of economic growth — a measure known as “carbon intensity” — by 40 to 45 percent by 2020, compared with 2005 levels. India set a domestic emissions intensity reduction target of 20 to 25 percent by 2020, compared with 2005 levels, excluding its agricultural sector.

[Hey, this looks pretty in line with the class simulation. P.S. Need we remind the developed countries that these are voluntary targets? We don't have to do them -- we're not historically responsible for these emissions -- but we will take them on as national actions. And we'll be accountable to our own parliament, thank you very much. =P]

The United States pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about 17 percent by 2020 compared with 2005, contingent on Congress’s enacting climate change and energy legislation.

Negotiators are trying to write an enforceable global climate change treaty, but there is little expectation that such an agreement will be reached this year. The European Union’s climate commissioner, Connie Hedegaard of Denmark, said Tuesday that nations should now aim to reach an agreement in 2011 at a United Nations conference in South Africa, rather than this year in Mexico.

[Maybe South Africa rather than Mexico should be the next Stanford trip? We have a Stanford center in S. Africa ... ] 

Times of India, on the other hand, emphasizes in their reporting the "conditional association" with the accord.

India okays Copenhagen Accord, with riders

After three months of confabulation within the government, India on Tuesday allowed a conditional association of its name with the Copenhagen Accord. The accord, which had been negotiated by 29 countries including India at the Danish capital in December 2009, had become a bone of contention with some countries refusing to accept it while the BASIC countries distanced themselves from the contentious document.

While the US and other developed countries were keen that key countries, such as India and China, should back the accord to the hilt, the two along with South Africa and Brazil had instead indicated that the primacy of the formal UN negotiations should be maintained.

Union environment minister Jairam Ramesh told TOI, "We have made the conditional association and I have been informed by the Chinese government that it too will associate itself with the accord in a similar fashion as India."

The BASIC countries had stepped away after an assessment that the accord, if operationalised immediately, as recommended by the rich countries, would tilt the balance of international climate negotiations against them. They demanded that the accord, which only a select group of countries had been party to, should either be treated as a mere guidance note or be taken through the formal negotiations and be accepted by all the 180 plus countries in order to gain greater legal status -- something that failed to happen at the Copenhagen meet.

Now India has reiterated that "the accord is meant to facilitate the ongoing negotiations in the two tracks (of the formal UN negotiations)" and that it is not a legally binding document. India has also demanded that its name be used to back the accord only if all its conditions, including the fact that the pact will not become a new track of negotiations or a template for outcomes, is indicated in the Copenhagen Accord.

So it goes...
URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/science/earth/10climate.html
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/global-warming/India-okays-Copenhagen-Accord-with-riders/articleshow/5665061.cms

MRV there yet? MRV there yet?

MRV is apparently still being made an issue. "Scrutiny" is out. "Consultation and analysis" were what were agreed to. "Verification that is non-intrusive" might be possible.

Emissions: China joins India on scrutiny
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/article228685.ece?homepage=true

"On Wednesday, Mr. Xie [Zhenhua, vice-chairman of NDRC and one of China's lead negotiators at COP15] also lent support to India's opposition to any international scrutiny of voluntary actions to reduce emissions, which the United States and some European countries are calling for. That, Mr. Xie said, was out of the question, being “an issue of sovereignty”.

“Autonomous efforts must not be subject to MRV [Measurement, Reporting and Verification],” he stressed. He, however, added that China had agreed to “verification that is non-intrusive” in the interest of advancing negotiations at Copenhagen, and to “reduce mistrust” with the West. While China and India had initially been opposed to any MRV of voluntary projects, they had agreed to “consultations and analysis” in the negotiations but not to “scrutiny”.

Developed countries [on the other hand] Mr. Xie said, “should be subject to MRV in emission reductions and also in providing technological, financial and capacity building support to developing countries”.

The question of international scrutiny of developing countries' mitigation actions remains a crucial sticking point in talks between the West and the developing world. In its submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) last month, the U.S. reiterated its call for “scrutiny” of voluntary actions, though it later changed its position following opposition from India, as The Hindu first reported on February 28."

Interviews with Jairam Ramesh, post-Copenhagen

'Kyoto is in intensive care' Q&A: Jairam Ramesh, Minister of State, Environment and Forests Business Standard / New Delhi January 15, 2010, 0:55 IST Jairam Ramesh is perhaps the most intelligent and energetic environment minister India has had. He has brought a new sense of purpose to his ministry, outlined an ambitious domestic agenda, introduced greater transparency, and dramatically altered India’s negotiating stance in the global talks on climate change. Here, for the first time, Ramesh speaks to Business Standard on what he has done so far and his future agenda. In the first of a three-part interview Ramesh speaks about the meaning of the Copenhagen Accord. Subsequent instalments will deal with the domestic policy agenda.

More than China: India's Role at COP15

I've been meaning to post this intriguing piece from UPI. It contends that the US/EU view of COP15 as primarily a financing, tech-transfer, carbon market (plus verification) conference, diverged from that of India and China.

According to the authors, China pursued multiple agendas -- not only its "national interest" in climate markets, but also cementing its "leadership role in the developing world." However, in their estimation, India was really the big surprise -- a potential ally to the West who has been pushed into common cause with China. (Even though the countries may not have the same needs and are at different points in their paths to development). While India is often cited as a counterweight to Chinese influence in Asia, they warn that if the West (and the U.S. in particular) do not carefully cultivate that alliance, the relationship between New Delhi and Beijing may become increasingly cooperative.

Lesson: "The West made the mistake in Copenhagen of lumping India together with China, and this mistaken view proved to be self-fulfilling." [NOTE: In Schneider's COP15 class, we watched this "bundling" happen over and over again. It was a big problem.]

Copenhagen Consequences for the U.S., China and India

The frantic post-conference scramble for high ground shows that whatever it was that happened at Copenhagen, it was not expected. At least not by the United States... to understand what really happened and why, it is necessary to take a step back and take a wider perspective - one that includes not only the climate accord, but also the global economic situation and geopolitics.

From the perspective of the United States, European Union and other industrialized countries, the focus was largely on creating financial mechanisms around carbon trading, technology transfers, financing for "green tech," economic growth targets and verification regimes. It would have been more accurate to bill it a "climate market" conference.... With the right deal the global carbon market alone, worth an estimated US$118 billion in 2008, could potentially be worth more than US$2 trillion by 2020....

Negotiators from the United States, European Union and other industrialized countries had been working on this financial track for a long time, and likely believed going in to Copenhagen that the groundwork had been laid for such a deal. The assumption was likely that China, given enough incentives - especially around technology transfer - would sign on out of self-interest, and others such as India would give in to pressure to accede rather than risk isolation.

However, while the West was largely looking at Copenhagen as a climate market deal, others were taking a more multi-faceted view. China, as it often does in international negotiations, was pursuing multiple agendas. It engaged in climate market negotiations to press for national advantage, but was also using the meeting to cement its role as a leadership voice in the developing world. This was to be expected.

The article's analysis on India:

The big surprise was India. After sending some mixed messages before the conference, New Delhi finally made it clear that as far as it was concerned the meeting was about long-term strategic options. It questioned the good faith of the Western negotiators, with at least one Indian strategist pointing out that some of the same people involved in credit default swaps that contributed to the collapse of the global financial system were involved in setting up carbon trading....

India didn't like or trust the proposed deal and wanted to show the West that a compliant India could not be taken for granted. Just as important, it wanted to show that, should a perceived fair deal with the West not be possible, it had other options, namely a closer relationship with China. This dovetailed with a broader strategic reevaluation of the India-China relationship.

China is aware that some think India should be used to counter it, and would like to increase cooperation, rather than competition, with its Himalayan neighbor so that it can focus on other arenas. And India is questioning if it should allow itself to be used as a pawn against China, taking a loss both economically and in terms of security, but seeing little benefit.

As a result, a fascinating and potentially game-changing geopolitical pas-de-deux unfolded in Copenhagen. The international media and punditocracy christened the United States and China the new G2, in reference to the expected preeminent leadership roles of the United States and China of their respective developed and developing country contingents. But what increasingly became clear was that a different G2 was influencing the agenda: China and India.

India demonstrated that, while it wants an equal alliance with the United States and its Western allies, a subservient allegiance is not an option."

The authors finish with this recommendation:

The gain of getting the world's most populous democracy on its side - not on China's - is worth some concessions, not just for the sake of a climate deal but for larger strategic purposes. The West made the mistake in Copenhagen of lumping India together with China, and this mistaken view proved to be self-fulfilling. Analysis of India has long suffered from "hyphenation." First it was India-Pakistan, now India-China. At the beginning the India-China link was competitive; Copenhagen has shown it has the potential to become cooperative. The time has come to rehyphenate democratic, economically strong, English-speaking India. It would be to the benefit of the United States and its allies to create a new cooperative link: India-United States.

Article URL: http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2010/01/04/copenhagen_consequences_for_the_us_china_and_india/1537

Random Hallway Encounter - Jairam Ramesh

In the Main Hall, around 11 a.m., next to the black-and-white globe...

Whoa! I just shook hands with Jairam Ramesh, the Indian Minister of the Environment and Forestry. Woohoo!!!

See, I'm kind of a fan. I wrote a policy paper on India's approach to climate negotiations for the COP class, so I've read a lot of his speeches and pronouncements to the media. And now to see him in person! It's kind of awesome.

He was strolling along the hallway with his assistant. I happened by, and suddenly, it was like "Wait! That's Jairam Ramesh! In real life!" I went up to him and said, "Minister! I just wanted to say, 'Hello!'" and extended my hand. He looked a little bemused that he had a fan.

I didn't say anything else, as I assumed he was on his way somewhere, but I walked away with a huge grin on my face.

China + G77: The end of a beautiful friendship?

There has been talk of a split between China and the G77, who have traditionally negotiated as a bloc at climate conferences. For example, see this piece in the Guardian discussing the rift over Tuvalu's proposal or a more positive note by Michael Wara at the Environmental and Energy Insights blog.

So I wonder if these photos are a hint ...

10:49 PM on Wednesday, December 9 - Still open late at night

7:30 PM on Friday, December 11 - Something's different here

Ha 哈哈. Granted, it was a Friday night and maybe everyone went home. But a white death shroud? Kind of 夸张. And there *were* negotiations on Saturday, too.

Okay, not that there's any animosity between China and the G77 in particular. It's more of a natural, amicable differentiation of responsibilities (har har) as nations' interests and capabilities evolve. After all, China does have a distinct emissions profile and is clearly at a different stage of development than most countries in the grouping. So moving ahead of the G77 members, China and India have in recent weeks stated their willingness to take on some sort of carbon intensity commitment. (Though binding emissions cuts are still out, and the right to development for poor countries remains a fundamental part of the platform).

The group also appears to have maintained a united position on what they're demanding from developed nations: living up to historical responsibility, making deep and significant cuts in emissions, major funding for adaptation and mitigation.