More than China: India's Role at COP15

I've been meaning to post this intriguing piece from UPI. It contends that the US/EU view of COP15 as primarily a financing, tech-transfer, carbon market (plus verification) conference, diverged from that of India and China.

According to the authors, China pursued multiple agendas -- not only its "national interest" in climate markets, but also cementing its "leadership role in the developing world." However, in their estimation, India was really the big surprise -- a potential ally to the West who has been pushed into common cause with China. (Even though the countries may not have the same needs and are at different points in their paths to development). While India is often cited as a counterweight to Chinese influence in Asia, they warn that if the West (and the U.S. in particular) do not carefully cultivate that alliance, the relationship between New Delhi and Beijing may become increasingly cooperative.

Lesson: "The West made the mistake in Copenhagen of lumping India together with China, and this mistaken view proved to be self-fulfilling." [NOTE: In Schneider's COP15 class, we watched this "bundling" happen over and over again. It was a big problem.]

Copenhagen Consequences for the U.S., China and India

The frantic post-conference scramble for high ground shows that whatever it was that happened at Copenhagen, it was not expected. At least not by the United States... to understand what really happened and why, it is necessary to take a step back and take a wider perspective - one that includes not only the climate accord, but also the global economic situation and geopolitics.

From the perspective of the United States, European Union and other industrialized countries, the focus was largely on creating financial mechanisms around carbon trading, technology transfers, financing for "green tech," economic growth targets and verification regimes. It would have been more accurate to bill it a "climate market" conference.... With the right deal the global carbon market alone, worth an estimated US$118 billion in 2008, could potentially be worth more than US$2 trillion by 2020....

Negotiators from the United States, European Union and other industrialized countries had been working on this financial track for a long time, and likely believed going in to Copenhagen that the groundwork had been laid for such a deal. The assumption was likely that China, given enough incentives - especially around technology transfer - would sign on out of self-interest, and others such as India would give in to pressure to accede rather than risk isolation.

However, while the West was largely looking at Copenhagen as a climate market deal, others were taking a more multi-faceted view. China, as it often does in international negotiations, was pursuing multiple agendas. It engaged in climate market negotiations to press for national advantage, but was also using the meeting to cement its role as a leadership voice in the developing world. This was to be expected.

The article's analysis on India:

The big surprise was India. After sending some mixed messages before the conference, New Delhi finally made it clear that as far as it was concerned the meeting was about long-term strategic options. It questioned the good faith of the Western negotiators, with at least one Indian strategist pointing out that some of the same people involved in credit default swaps that contributed to the collapse of the global financial system were involved in setting up carbon trading....

India didn't like or trust the proposed deal and wanted to show the West that a compliant India could not be taken for granted. Just as important, it wanted to show that, should a perceived fair deal with the West not be possible, it had other options, namely a closer relationship with China. This dovetailed with a broader strategic reevaluation of the India-China relationship.

China is aware that some think India should be used to counter it, and would like to increase cooperation, rather than competition, with its Himalayan neighbor so that it can focus on other arenas. And India is questioning if it should allow itself to be used as a pawn against China, taking a loss both economically and in terms of security, but seeing little benefit.

As a result, a fascinating and potentially game-changing geopolitical pas-de-deux unfolded in Copenhagen. The international media and punditocracy christened the United States and China the new G2, in reference to the expected preeminent leadership roles of the United States and China of their respective developed and developing country contingents. But what increasingly became clear was that a different G2 was influencing the agenda: China and India.

India demonstrated that, while it wants an equal alliance with the United States and its Western allies, a subservient allegiance is not an option."

The authors finish with this recommendation:

The gain of getting the world's most populous democracy on its side - not on China's - is worth some concessions, not just for the sake of a climate deal but for larger strategic purposes. The West made the mistake in Copenhagen of lumping India together with China, and this mistaken view proved to be self-fulfilling. Analysis of India has long suffered from "hyphenation." First it was India-Pakistan, now India-China. At the beginning the India-China link was competitive; Copenhagen has shown it has the potential to become cooperative. The time has come to rehyphenate democratic, economically strong, English-speaking India. It would be to the benefit of the United States and its allies to create a new cooperative link: India-United States.

Article URL: http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2010/01/04/copenhagen_consequences_for_the_us_china_and_india/1537

Change in Strategy?

Happy 2010 everyone! It's a brand new year.

In today's Washington Post, there's an article by John Pomfret analyzing China's recent behavior on the international stage, including at COP15. He uses language that's a bit more colorful -- for instance, he quotes a "senior U.S. official" talking about the "sense of triumphalism" on the part of the Chinese. (In my own analysis, I think I went with a sense of "satisfaction.") But it seems like people are generally on the same page.

Still, U.S. officials and analysts have noticed a new assertiveness -- what one senior U.S. official called a "sense of triumphalism" -- on the part of officials and the public in China. This stems from a sense in Beijing that the global economic crisis proves the superiority of China's controlled economy and its authoritarian political system -- and that the West, and in particular the United States, is in decline.

This triumphalism was on display during the recently concluded climate talks in Copenhagen. China only sent a deputy foreign minister to meetings set for the level of heads of state; its representatives publicly clashed with their American counterparts. And during the climax of the conference, China's security team tried to block Obama and the rest of his entourage from entering a meeting chaired by China's prime minister, Wen Jiabao.

That type of swagger is new for China and it could make for a stronger reaction from Beijing.

"If they really believe the United States is in decline and that China will soon emerge as a superpower, they may seek to take on the U.S. in ways that will cause real problems," said Bonnie S. Glaser, an expert on China with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Complicating this picture is the view of some American analysts that the Obama administration -- with its intensive outreach to Beijing -- tried too hard in its first year to cultivate ties with China. Playing hard to get might have helped smooth out China's swagger, they suggest.

"Somehow the administration signaled to the Chinese that we need them more than they need us," Lampton [David Lampton of Johns Hopkins SAIS] said. "We're in the role of the supplicant."

I would add that the "triumphalism" was not only on display; it was a concerted effort by China to send a signal. This doesn't mean such an uncompromising attitude will be manifested in all future COPs, especially if they can start successfully reaching their carbon intensity targets. In that case, the Chinese might decide to act in a cooperative fashion and help reach a global agreement because it would be affordable! But at COP15, shaping how China is viewed by others (the U.S. in particular) was more important than coming to an agreement that, in all likelihood, would simply present more loose ends, and which wouldn't have made much of a difference to the country's domestic situation anyway.

Looking ahead, we may see a coordinated strategy from Beijing to forge a new international reputation. China would like to be seen as the "tough, independent new kid on the block" and will probably pursue this goal in contexts where it doesn't risk much (like COP). They will want to build this reputation when it's cheap to do so, because it'll put them in a stronger position for future negotiations with the Americans on more sensitive issues -- negotiations in which they might actually have to give something up.

[I could also be wrong, and rather than carrying out a well-considered geopolitical strategy, the Chinese may fully buy into the self-inflating rhetoric that "China is rising and America is on the wane, so we can do whatever we want". Some hard-line nationalists do use this type of language, and I've heard reports that Chinese diplomats have had to ... secure their nationalist credentials with stronger language.

Faced with such a scenario, the world would need to take action to channel China's energy into a more positive expression. The "tough, independent new kid on the block" should understand that we live in an interconnected world, and we all must do our part! That involves give-and-take, cooperating, "sharing" and "playing nice" with others.]

Seesaw Depressing Day

It's been up and down today. Went to sleep around 6 or 7 a.m. happy that the door was now open for an agreement, because the US had moved. We were waiting, then, for China to respond.

I had a bit of a suspicion that this might not pan out the way we hoped, so I sent a caveat to the Stanford list, following up.

P.S. In case it wasn't clear ... this note is not saying any of this *will* happen. It's saying that there's a possibility, a potential opening, so don't completely despair. Hopefully the Parties will take it up and keep working toward an agreement.

It's also possible that political exigencies will overtake what seems to be a real possibility. As Lily Cheng pointed out last night, the US and China both know what they have to do on climate. But there are definitely things that can still get in the way.

Then this morning, I awoke to reports that Wen Jiabao did *not* attend the meetings with other world leaders, including Pres. Obama, and instead sent another Chinese official. WTF! What is China doing?

This did not bode well. The rest of the day seemed to fluctuate, sometimes with pessimistic news, other times with hopeful notes. It was all just so unclear. I saw some articles that said progress was again possible, because US had offered funding, and China was showing "flexibility" on international verification. But then bad news about Wen ...

The whole afternoon, I just couldn't shake the feeling that the COP was failing, and we were going to wake up tomorrow morning with everything having imploded, no agreement reached, nothing close to what we hoped coming through this conference.

Later in the day, though, I heard news that Obama and Wen were meeting alone (bilaterally), so perhaps some discussion was happening. In news reports, the meeting was termed "productive".

Brief exchange with Arlo, Stanford's communications specialist at COP15 who is live-blogging the event. I e-mailed to him:

I'm only [now feeling] a little depressed, because while the window of opportunity is open, China is not moving forward to seize it. They're still holding rigid, playing a political game of brinksmanship. Given the constraints of its domestic political situation, the US has done something to hold open the door. Now we need the Chinese to reciprocate.

I have been hearing conflicting reports all day; some are very pessimistic, some are saying the Chinese are warming up. The Prime MInister did NOT attend the group meeting(s) with Obama, but later, Obama and Wen Jiabao did meet bilaterally.

It is unclear what's happening, Karim's appraisals seem very down, news reports aren't shedding much light except that there's a new draft text in case the conference fails. Sad.

Two cents (0.136 RMB) on China + some analysis

While negotiations seemed deadlocked earlier today, measures taken this afternoon may have revived hopes for an agreement in Copenhagen.

Two of the major stumbling blocks to reaching an agreement at COP15 have been the positions of the United States and China. The general feeling from both developing countries and our European friends (see here and here) is that the U.S. offer to reduce emissions is underwhelming. (The U.S. proposes reducing its GHG emissions 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, equivalent to reducing 3-4% below 1990 levels). American suggestions of $10 billion in funding to developing countries through 2012 have also been criticized as inadequate.

Conversely, the refusal of the Chinese to accept MRV requirements -- measuring, reporting, and verification -- claiming that it violates national sovereignty, is a major sticking point with the Americans. It’s been cleverly couched by the Chinese as, We aren't taking [getting?] your funding. And since you aren’t paying for any of these projects, no MRV. Or as Wen Jiabao said on Thursday:

"For developing countries, only those mitigation actions supported internationally will be subject to the MRV." Any "voluntary mitigation actions [that China takes on by itself] should not be subject to international MRV.”

China has indicated that its 2020 carbon intensity goal counts as a voluntary action at the international level, though it will be legally required at the domestic level. These points of contention have held up negotiations for several days, with a pretty pessimistic outlook this morning.

However, by late this afternoon, things just might have shifted. At an event in the evening put on by the BlueGreen Alliance (a uniting of workers and environmental groups to further the agenda for "good jobs, clean environment, green economy"), I ran into Barbara Finamore, the head of NRDC’s China program, who has decades of experience working in the country and who has contacts well-positioned to know how the Chinese delegation operates at international negotiations. (See her quote in the New York Times on December 15. By the way, for transparency's sake, I should note she was my boss when I worked in NRDC's Beijing office in 2007.)

Barbara felt that Secretary of State Clinton’s announcement -- that the U.S. will help raise funding of $100 billion for developing countries to deal with climate change -- could break the logjam. Since the U.S. has made a move, it is now up to China, which has been asking for more concrete steps from the Americans all along, to reciprocate.

According to Clinton (transcript of speech and related article):

"the United States is prepared to work with other countries toward a goal of jointly mobilizing 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the climate change needs” of developing nations.

However, this must be done "in the context of a strong accord in which all major economies stand behind meaningful mitigation actions and provide full transparency as to their implementation.''

In other words, this effort to mobilize funding ("from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance") will commence only if (1) a deal is reached, and (2) the deal must include measures that ensure "transparency" and the ability to conduct MRV. The funding will have a "significant focus on forestry and adaptation" and is "particularly ... for the poorest and most vulnerable" countries.

Several members of the G77 have already sent messages to the Chinese indicating that they are amenable to this plan because they truly need and want the funding, and have asked the Chinese to make a deal possible. (This group includes the Maldives, Ethiopia and Bangladesh. See here.) This is not to say all G77 countries are convinced. Lumumba di-Aping of Sudan, who acts as chief negotiator of the G77, said, "This is a good signal, but it's still insufficient. We need more money." (Quoted here.)

On the Chinese side, some leaders are worried that that MRV could mean intrusive actions, such as factory-level inspections, with foreign experts entering individual facilities to ascertain whether China is living up to its carbon intensity goals. They feel this is a major affront to sovereignty. Beijing says that it will make its efforts transparent, and compliant with national laws and regulations, and this should be good enough. Or as He Yafei, vice-foreign minister, put it, China’s laws would guarantee compliance. (Mentioned in NYTimes article from December 15. Ugh, don't get me started on how this seems preposterous.)

Finamore and others have been attempting to convince parties on both sides that intrusive inspections of this sort are not what MRV is about, and such drastic measures are, in fact, not needed to verify that the Chinese are meeting their commitments. For one, China publishes data about its electricity generation, fuel use and energy use every year. The data are publicly available, and other international institutions (including multilateral lending institutions like the Asian Development Bank) make full use of it.

If the Chinese can continue working toward transparency and publicizing their actions, there is enough information in these and other reports to track progress in emissions reductions. The Chinese can feel that respect for their sovereignty is upheld, while the Americans (the Senate in particular) can be confident that the Chinese are not only taking on some of the global burden, but that the international community can verify progress.

Some of you will ask, How do we know China will actually publish accurate statistics? What if officials fudge the numbers?

For example, in the last Five-year Plan that runs through 2010, there was an energy intensity target, which would work much the same way this new carbon intensity target is supposed to work. Provincial leaders are evaluated in part based on whether they meet this target or not. Don’t they have an incentive to lie?

While there are many examples of this problem in China, and it remains an ongoing concern, there are also several factors that can mitigate the problem, at least when it comes to energy and GHG emissions reporting:

1. The Chinese government needs these statistics, too. As Lily Cheng pointed out, Beijing wants accurate data to work with.

2. A revision to the Statistics Law (more details here) was passed this year and comes into effect in January 2010. It imposes severe penalties (potentially even jail time) for leaders that fake or alter statistics. This should be a big deterrent.

3. Increasing energy efficiency and reducing emissions are things many local leaders want to do voluntarily. According to Finamore, mayors and other officials understand that these measures make enterprises more competitive and that it saves them money.

So the incentives line up in a way that should make energy statistics more believable and accurate. China, of course, can continue to make its domestic situation more transparent and potentially allow more independent auditing. But the measures wouldn’t have to be as intrusive as people think.

Neither the U.S. or China is likely to make a move that makes it look like it is capitulating on key matters -- but the gap between the two sides has begun to close, and thus, Finamore says “the door is open” for some form of an agreement.

-----

Additional points:

1. This situation could potentially further fracture the unity of the G77 + China grouping. As noted above, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Ethiopia, among others, have contacted the Chinese to express their support for an agreement in the wake of this announcement. Furthermore, in a televised debate, the president of the Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, even criticized the idea being floated by some of the G77 and China that "no deal is better than making a bad deal." According to The Australian, Nasheed said that "we are in the G77 and we want an agreement from Copenhagen. We do not agree with that viewpoint at all [that failing to make a deal would be better than a bad deal]. We have to have an agreement."

On the other side, in addition to Sudan/G77 head Lumumba di-Aping's intonation for "more money," Brazil has also raised concerns about "intrusive verification," while Ecuador's foreign minister noted that “What we really need are firm mechanisms to reduce emissions from industrialized countries. Financial mechanisms are useful, but not central, not a solution.” (Quoted in the New York Times).

This kind of split is probably not something China wants to preside over. It also wants to avoid the even worse position of being seen as the cause of failure at COP15. This all adds up to more impetus for the Chinese to respond. Since Chinese premier Wen Jiabao arrived on Wednesday, he has met with Brazil, Bangladesh, Trinidad, Ethiopia and Sudan. The U.S. in turn, has been meeting with India (among other G77 members) and may be reaching an agreement. Jairam Ramesh, India's minister of the environment and forestry says that the two countries agree on about "75% of things", and the last 25% is on ... you guessed it, MRV.

2. See this piece about the varying interpretations of when MRV can/should be applied to projects that countries undertake. US says all actions to reduce emissions by developing countries should be subject to MRV. Many developing nations say that only projects that get outside funding should have MRV requirements. This conflict dates back to the Bali Action Plan, and much of the debate centers around the placement of a comma in the text (!), which took delegates more than two hours to discuss. (!!!)

3. If worse comes to worse, another NRDC expert said that a bilateral statement by the US and China to jointly combat climate change might be the next best option. Let's hope it doesn't come to that.

4. Associated Press has a good article on the implications of the U.S. offer on aid.

5. Check out Barbara Finamore's blog at NRDC's website with commentary on Copenhagen, as well as China's environment and its energy situation.