Jairam Ramesh is perhaps the most intelligent and energetic environment minister India has had. He has brought a new sense of purpose to his ministry, outlined an ambitious domestic agenda, introduced greater transparency, and dramatically altered India’s negotiating stance in the global talks on climate change. Here, for the first time, Ramesh speaks to Business Standard on what he has done so far and his future agenda. In the first of a three-part interview Ramesh speaks about the meaning of the Copenhagen Accord. Subsequent instalments will deal with the domestic policy agenda. |
Showing posts with label COP15. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COP15. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
Interviews with Jairam Ramesh, post-Copenhagen
Sunday, January 10, 2010
More than China: India's Role at COP15
I've been meaning to post this intriguing piece from UPI. It contends that the US/EU view of COP15 as primarily a financing, tech-transfer, carbon market (plus verification) conference, diverged from that of India and China.
According to the authors, China pursued multiple agendas -- not only its "national interest" in climate markets, but also cementing its "leadership role in the developing world." However, in their estimation, India was really the big surprise -- a potential ally to the West who has been pushed into common cause with China. (Even though the countries may not have the same needs and are at different points in their paths to development). While India is often cited as a counterweight to Chinese influence in Asia, they warn that if the West (and the U.S. in particular) do not carefully cultivate that alliance, the relationship between New Delhi and Beijing may become increasingly cooperative.
Lesson: "The West made the mistake in Copenhagen of lumping India together with China, and this mistaken view proved to be self-fulfilling." [NOTE: In Schneider's COP15 class, we watched this "bundling" happen over and over again. It was a big problem.]
Copenhagen Consequences for the U.S., China and India
The article's analysis on India:
The authors finish with this recommendation:
Article URL: http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2010/01/04/copenhagen_consequences_for_the_us_china_and_india/1537
According to the authors, China pursued multiple agendas -- not only its "national interest" in climate markets, but also cementing its "leadership role in the developing world." However, in their estimation, India was really the big surprise -- a potential ally to the West who has been pushed into common cause with China. (Even though the countries may not have the same needs and are at different points in their paths to development). While India is often cited as a counterweight to Chinese influence in Asia, they warn that if the West (and the U.S. in particular) do not carefully cultivate that alliance, the relationship between New Delhi and Beijing may become increasingly cooperative.
Lesson: "The West made the mistake in Copenhagen of lumping India together with China, and this mistaken view proved to be self-fulfilling." [NOTE: In Schneider's COP15 class, we watched this "bundling" happen over and over again. It was a big problem.]
Copenhagen Consequences for the U.S., China and India
The frantic post-conference scramble for high ground shows that whatever it was that happened at Copenhagen, it was not expected. At least not by the United States... to understand what really happened and why, it is necessary to take a step back and take a wider perspective - one that includes not only the climate accord, but also the global economic situation and geopolitics.
From the perspective of the United States, European Union and other industrialized countries, the focus was largely on creating financial mechanisms around carbon trading, technology transfers, financing for "green tech," economic growth targets and verification regimes. It would have been more accurate to bill it a "climate market" conference.... With the right deal the global carbon market alone, worth an estimated US$118 billion in 2008, could potentially be worth more than US$2 trillion by 2020....
Negotiators from the United States, European Union and other industrialized countries had been working on this financial track for a long time, and likely believed going in to Copenhagen that the groundwork had been laid for such a deal. The assumption was likely that China, given enough incentives - especially around technology transfer - would sign on out of self-interest, and others such as India would give in to pressure to accede rather than risk isolation.
However, while the West was largely looking at Copenhagen as a climate market deal, others were taking a more multi-faceted view. China, as it often does in international negotiations, was pursuing multiple agendas. It engaged in climate market negotiations to press for national advantage, but was also using the meeting to cement its role as a leadership voice in the developing world. This was to be expected.
The article's analysis on India:
The big surprise was India. After sending some mixed messages before the conference, New Delhi finally made it clear that as far as it was concerned the meeting was about long-term strategic options. It questioned the good faith of the Western negotiators, with at least one Indian strategist pointing out that some of the same people involved in credit default swaps that contributed to the collapse of the global financial system were involved in setting up carbon trading....
India didn't like or trust the proposed deal and wanted to show the West that a compliant India could not be taken for granted. Just as important, it wanted to show that, should a perceived fair deal with the West not be possible, it had other options, namely a closer relationship with China. This dovetailed with a broader strategic reevaluation of the India-China relationship.
China is aware that some think India should be used to counter it, and would like to increase cooperation, rather than competition, with its Himalayan neighbor so that it can focus on other arenas. And India is questioning if it should allow itself to be used as a pawn against China, taking a loss both economically and in terms of security, but seeing little benefit.
As a result, a fascinating and potentially game-changing geopolitical pas-de-deux unfolded in Copenhagen. The international media and punditocracy christened the United States and China the new G2, in reference to the expected preeminent leadership roles of the United States and China of their respective developed and developing country contingents. But what increasingly became clear was that a different G2 was influencing the agenda: China and India.
India demonstrated that, while it wants an equal alliance with the United States and its Western allies, a subservient allegiance is not an option."
The authors finish with this recommendation:
The gain of getting the world's most populous democracy on its side - not on China's - is worth some concessions, not just for the sake of a climate deal but for larger strategic purposes. The West made the mistake in Copenhagen of lumping India together with China, and this mistaken view proved to be self-fulfilling. Analysis of India has long suffered from "hyphenation." First it was India-Pakistan, now India-China. At the beginning the India-China link was competitive; Copenhagen has shown it has the potential to become cooperative. The time has come to rehyphenate democratic, economically strong, English-speaking India. It would be to the benefit of the United States and its allies to create a new cooperative link: India-United States.
Article URL: http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2010/01/04/copenhagen_consequences_for_the_us_china_and_india/1537
Sunday, January 3, 2010
Change in Strategy?
Happy 2010 everyone! It's a brand new year.
In today's Washington Post, there's an article by John Pomfret analyzing China's recent behavior on the international stage, including at COP15. He uses language that's a bit more colorful -- for instance, he quotes a "senior U.S. official" talking about the "sense of triumphalism" on the part of the Chinese. (In my own analysis, I think I went with a sense of "satisfaction.") But it seems like people are generally on the same page.
I would add that the "triumphalism" was not only on display; it was a concerted effort by China to send a signal. This doesn't mean such an uncompromising attitude will be manifested in all future COPs, especially if they can start successfully reaching their carbon intensity targets. In that case, the Chinese might decide to act in a cooperative fashion and help reach a global agreement because it would be affordable! But at COP15, shaping how China is viewed by others (the U.S. in particular) was more important than coming to an agreement that, in all likelihood, would simply present more loose ends, and which wouldn't have made much of a difference to the country's domestic situation anyway.
Looking ahead, we may see a coordinated strategy from Beijing to forge a new international reputation. China would like to be seen as the "tough, independent new kid on the block" and will probably pursue this goal in contexts where it doesn't risk much (like COP). They will want to build this reputation when it's cheap to do so, because it'll put them in a stronger position for future negotiations with the Americans on more sensitive issues -- negotiations in which they might actually have to give something up.
[I could also be wrong, and rather than carrying out a well-considered geopolitical strategy, the Chinese may fully buy into the self-inflating rhetoric that "China is rising and America is on the wane, so we can do whatever we want". Some hard-line nationalists do use this type of language, and I've heard reports that Chinese diplomats have had to ... secure their nationalist credentials with stronger language.
Faced with such a scenario, the world would need to take action to channel China's energy into a more positive expression. The "tough, independent new kid on the block" should understand that we live in an interconnected world, and we all must do our part! That involves give-and-take, cooperating, "sharing" and "playing nice" with others.]
In today's Washington Post, there's an article by John Pomfret analyzing China's recent behavior on the international stage, including at COP15. He uses language that's a bit more colorful -- for instance, he quotes a "senior U.S. official" talking about the "sense of triumphalism" on the part of the Chinese. (In my own analysis, I think I went with a sense of "satisfaction.") But it seems like people are generally on the same page.
Still, U.S. officials and analysts have noticed a new assertiveness -- what one senior U.S. official called a "sense of triumphalism" -- on the part of officials and the public in China. This stems from a sense in Beijing that the global economic crisis proves the superiority of China's controlled economy and its authoritarian political system -- and that the West, and in particular the United States, is in decline.
This triumphalism was on display during the recently concluded climate talks in Copenhagen. China only sent a deputy foreign minister to meetings set for the level of heads of state; its representatives publicly clashed with their American counterparts. And during the climax of the conference, China's security team tried to block Obama and the rest of his entourage from entering a meeting chaired by China's prime minister, Wen Jiabao.
That type of swagger is new for China and it could make for a stronger reaction from Beijing.
"If they really believe the United States is in decline and that China will soon emerge as a superpower, they may seek to take on the U.S. in ways that will cause real problems," said Bonnie S. Glaser, an expert on China with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Complicating this picture is the view of some American analysts that the Obama administration -- with its intensive outreach to Beijing -- tried too hard in its first year to cultivate ties with China. Playing hard to get might have helped smooth out China's swagger, they suggest.
"Somehow the administration signaled to the Chinese that we need them more than they need us," Lampton [David Lampton of Johns Hopkins SAIS] said. "We're in the role of the supplicant."
I would add that the "triumphalism" was not only on display; it was a concerted effort by China to send a signal. This doesn't mean such an uncompromising attitude will be manifested in all future COPs, especially if they can start successfully reaching their carbon intensity targets. In that case, the Chinese might decide to act in a cooperative fashion and help reach a global agreement because it would be affordable! But at COP15, shaping how China is viewed by others (the U.S. in particular) was more important than coming to an agreement that, in all likelihood, would simply present more loose ends, and which wouldn't have made much of a difference to the country's domestic situation anyway.
Looking ahead, we may see a coordinated strategy from Beijing to forge a new international reputation. China would like to be seen as the "tough, independent new kid on the block" and will probably pursue this goal in contexts where it doesn't risk much (like COP). They will want to build this reputation when it's cheap to do so, because it'll put them in a stronger position for future negotiations with the Americans on more sensitive issues -- negotiations in which they might actually have to give something up.
[I could also be wrong, and rather than carrying out a well-considered geopolitical strategy, the Chinese may fully buy into the self-inflating rhetoric that "China is rising and America is on the wane, so we can do whatever we want". Some hard-line nationalists do use this type of language, and I've heard reports that Chinese diplomats have had to ... secure their nationalist credentials with stronger language.
Faced with such a scenario, the world would need to take action to channel China's energy into a more positive expression. The "tough, independent new kid on the block" should understand that we live in an interconnected world, and we all must do our part! That involves give-and-take, cooperating, "sharing" and "playing nice" with others.]
Thursday, December 31, 2009
仙人降世 ... Teaching the barbarians a lesson!
A hagiographic account from the Chinese Foreign Ministry of Premiere Wen Jiabao's brave and noble exploits at the Fifteenth Conference of Parties.
In the far-off realm of Copenhagen, Denmark, where snow and ice covered the earth, and subjects from many lands roamed the hallways of the Bella Center ...
Verdant Mountains Cannot Stop Water Flowing; Eastward the River Keeps on Going
Readers, please take no offense! I mean this all tongue in cheek. (Though I suspect the authors did not. ^ ^)
In the far-off realm of Copenhagen, Denmark, where snow and ice covered the earth, and subjects from many lands roamed the hallways of the Bella Center ...
Verdant Mountains Cannot Stop Water Flowing; Eastward the River Keeps on Going
Readers, please take no offense! I mean this all tongue in cheek. (Though I suspect the authors did not. ^ ^)
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Sing their praises...
More laudatory pieces in the Chinese media this week:
The key words here? "Sincerity, Confidence and Determination"
Allies from around the world have also joined in to tell China, "We've got your back!"
I feel like I'm editing CENA all over again, ha ha.
Undeniable facts showed China, by demonstrating sincerity, confidence and determination, has exerted maximum efforts to move forward the Copenhagen climate change negotiations with an eye on striking a widely accepted accord.
China plays key role making Copenhagen talks successful (Xinhua)
The key words here? "Sincerity, Confidence and Determination"
Allies from around the world have also joined in to tell China, "We've got your back!"
World media reports have praised China's efforts in promoting international cooperation to combat climate change and its contribution to a substantive result at the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. The per capita carbon emission in China is far lower than that in Western countries, the state media from different countries, including India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Central Africa Republic and Malawi, said recently. Acknowledging that China was facing a heavy task of development, they said that China's demand for due right to development was justifiable and reasonable.
During the Copenhagen Conference, China made all efforts to communicate and negotiate with other countries. It especially brought together developing nations to jointly safeguard their common interests and made a remarkable contribution to a substantive result of the conference, they said. Meanwhile, media in small island states, including Antigua and Barbuda, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, also spoke highly of China's responsible attitude and forceful measures on tackling climate change, saying China's effort could match that of any developed countries.
They said that some countries' criticism of China on the issue was groundless and irresponsible.
World media reports praise China's contribution to Copenhagen climate talks (Xinhua)
I feel like I'm editing CENA all over again, ha ha.
Compare and Contrast
A split-screen view of Wen Jiabao and Obama's Friday at the Bella Center would be extremely fun. In fact, I think I might make that later today!
The Chinese POV:
in contrast to the Obama show:
Obama raced clock, chaos, comedy for climate deal (AP)
Also take a look at the transcript of a briefing to the White House Press Gaggle on board Air Force One -- it's really worth a read! Agence France-Presse also has its version.
Obama raced clock, chaos, comedy for climate deal (AP)
Also take a look at the transcript of a briefing to the White House Press Gaggle on board Air Force One -- it's really worth a read! Agence France-Presse also has its version.
Sunday, December 27, 2009
"I don't want to say the gentleman is ignorant..."
Searched YouTube for the actual video of He Yafei bashing U.S. climate envoy Todd Stern for stating that funding would not be going to China.
Stern had been quoted as saying: "I do not envision public funds, certainly not from the US, going to China. We would intend to direct our public funds to the neediest countries." (Also quoted here.) He noted that "China -- to its great credit -- has a dynamic economy, and sits on some two trillion dollars in reserves. So we don’t think China would be the first candidate for public funding." Needless to say, the Chinese were not pleased.
Stern had been quoted as saying: "I do not envision public funds, certainly not from the US, going to China. We would intend to direct our public funds to the neediest countries." (Also quoted here.) He noted that "China -- to its great credit -- has a dynamic economy, and sits on some two trillion dollars in reserves. So we don’t think China would be the first candidate for public funding." Needless to say, the Chinese were not pleased.
Here's a CCTV report on the same spat: http://english.cctv.com/program/newshour/20091212/101174.shtml.
BONUS VIDEO - White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs threatening to pull out of a meeting when American journalists are blocked from entering a US-China meeting.
SUMMARY - What China accomplished
The short version of my previous post following the end of COP15, on China's role in the climate negotiations:
Up to the last minute, I held out hope that there would be a breakthrough, and during the conference, I was as inclined to lay responsibility on the Americans as the Chinese for the less-than-ideal outcome. It was only later on that I realized the mistake I had committed.
Like many others, I deluded myself into thinking that climate change was the priority for the Chinese in Copenhagen. I had bought into the narrative of a greening China that is committed to meeting this challenge, but is simply constrained by certain economic and developmental priorities. The Obama visit in November, the carbon intensity target, Beijing's public pronouncements leading up to Copenhagen -- these all pointed to a country that was interested in pursuing a serious global agreement.
In fact, if we look at the behavior of the Chinese delegation over the two weeks of COP15, it was more consistent with the pursuit of "national interest" more traditionally defined -- in IR terms. They intended to send a message to the US and the EU about China's status as a rising power: "The world needs China on board for any arrangement to succeed. Our country has arrived on the world stage, and we will not be dictated to by Western powers. In the future, our concerns -- however we define them -- must be taken into account as real constraints."
While the developed nations -- the Europeans especially -- thought the 40-45% carbon intensity cut was an "initial offer" to start the bargaining, it turned out to be a "final offer." It was something the Chinese were committed to doing regardless of the outcome at Copenhagen. (This was quite a clever move. In offering any sort of commitment, the Chinese went beyond their responsibilities under the Kyoto Protocol, while upholding the "common but differentiated responsibilities" framework as interpreted by the developing world.) Because this figure was already on the table, and because they were ready to act unilaterally, the Chinese did not have much stake in whether COP15 succeeded or failed. This presented an opportunity to advance a different political agenda important to Beijing.
Especially after funding for China was taken off the table in Week 1 (humorous at the time when vice-Foreign Minister He Yafei publicly bashed climate envoy Todd Stern. See video here), if the Chinese ultimately didn't care, there wasn't much else the US could offer to sway them. Furthermore, because the waters were so muddy, it would be easy to deflect blame, so Beijing risked very little to send this signal to the US. In the end, power politics outweighed the environmental impulse on the part of the Chinese.
This doesn't mean the Chinese aren't going to do anything about energy at home -- as NRDC China Program director Barbara Finamore has pointed out, they really do see the benefits of becoming more efficient. (Good for industry, good for competitiveness, good for the government coffer.) Thus, they will be serious about implementing the carbon intensity targets, which are by no means easy to accomplish. Tack onto that the updated Statistics Law that promises severe penalties for officials caught altering numbers, and there are some powerful incentives to get industry and government at all levels moving toward the goal.
In the end though, as an individual from Fiji who was also present at COP15 said to me, "The Chinese weren't here to play ball." After all, you don't keep Wen Jiabao out of the "group" negotiations where Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, and other heads of state are present if you are serious about finding a solution. You only do that if you want to send a different kind of message.
The lesson from Copenhagen? Realism bites back.
Up to the last minute, I held out hope that there would be a breakthrough, and during the conference, I was as inclined to lay responsibility on the Americans as the Chinese for the less-than-ideal outcome. It was only later on that I realized the mistake I had committed.
Like many others, I deluded myself into thinking that climate change was the priority for the Chinese in Copenhagen. I had bought into the narrative of a greening China that is committed to meeting this challenge, but is simply constrained by certain economic and developmental priorities. The Obama visit in November, the carbon intensity target, Beijing's public pronouncements leading up to Copenhagen -- these all pointed to a country that was interested in pursuing a serious global agreement.
In fact, if we look at the behavior of the Chinese delegation over the two weeks of COP15, it was more consistent with the pursuit of "national interest" more traditionally defined -- in IR terms. They intended to send a message to the US and the EU about China's status as a rising power: "The world needs China on board for any arrangement to succeed. Our country has arrived on the world stage, and we will not be dictated to by Western powers. In the future, our concerns -- however we define them -- must be taken into account as real constraints."
While the developed nations -- the Europeans especially -- thought the 40-45% carbon intensity cut was an "initial offer" to start the bargaining, it turned out to be a "final offer." It was something the Chinese were committed to doing regardless of the outcome at Copenhagen. (This was quite a clever move. In offering any sort of commitment, the Chinese went beyond their responsibilities under the Kyoto Protocol, while upholding the "common but differentiated responsibilities" framework as interpreted by the developing world.) Because this figure was already on the table, and because they were ready to act unilaterally, the Chinese did not have much stake in whether COP15 succeeded or failed. This presented an opportunity to advance a different political agenda important to Beijing.
Especially after funding for China was taken off the table in Week 1 (humorous at the time when vice-Foreign Minister He Yafei publicly bashed climate envoy Todd Stern. See video here), if the Chinese ultimately didn't care, there wasn't much else the US could offer to sway them. Furthermore, because the waters were so muddy, it would be easy to deflect blame, so Beijing risked very little to send this signal to the US. In the end, power politics outweighed the environmental impulse on the part of the Chinese.
This doesn't mean the Chinese aren't going to do anything about energy at home -- as NRDC China Program director Barbara Finamore has pointed out, they really do see the benefits of becoming more efficient. (Good for industry, good for competitiveness, good for the government coffer.) Thus, they will be serious about implementing the carbon intensity targets, which are by no means easy to accomplish. Tack onto that the updated Statistics Law that promises severe penalties for officials caught altering numbers, and there are some powerful incentives to get industry and government at all levels moving toward the goal.
In the end though, as an individual from Fiji who was also present at COP15 said to me, "The Chinese weren't here to play ball." After all, you don't keep Wen Jiabao out of the "group" negotiations where Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, and other heads of state are present if you are serious about finding a solution. You only do that if you want to send a different kind of message.
The lesson from Copenhagen? Realism bites back.
Friday, December 25, 2009
What China accomplished
UPDATE: Condensed version here.
How could this have happened? With mild hopes and expectations seemingly tempered by past experience and current conditions, COP15 was set to achieve a "politically binding" agreement, with a COP15.5 next year to finalize details. Why was the outcome so far from what all parties had been expecting?
I analyze here the role China may have had in these negotiations. It was only on Sunday, after chatting with Yue Li, and then in discussion with a Fijian conference participant on the plane to Frankfurt on Monday, that the terrible realization of what China was up to dawned on me. When I arrived in Calgary, the BBC was reporting Milliband's piece in the Guardian and China's response. Then the next day, a former professor sent me this article discussing how the Chinese delegation behaved, and it was a sad confirmation.
Many of us made the mistake of assuming they had made climate change a priority; we bought into the narrative that "China is greening. The country is doing everything it can to fight climate change, which China itself is vulnerable to. However, it does face certain economic constraints and developmental priorities, which are not unreasonable." We should have realized that, behind the scenes, other forces may have been motivating the Chinese.
Things looked a lot better going into COP15, especially when Beijing announced its carbon intensity commitment back in November. It was a catalyst for India, Brazil and South Africa to follow suit, and it set a positive tone for the negotiations. Though the targets were unambitious, most people thought these represented a starting point for the negotiations -- much as the EU had said 20% reductions were committed, and they would raise it to 30% if a meaningful agreement could be reached. India explicitly stated that its goal (20-25% reduction in carbon intensity) was only a starting point, and it might do more if an “equitable” agreement could be reached. Unfortunately, rather than a starting point for bargaining, the Chinese offer turned out to be the final asking price.
Tack onto that Obama's visit to Beijing in November, and the fact that he changed his arrival in Copenhagen from Dec. 9, the beginning of the conference, to Dec. 18, the last day, and it seemed like something had to have happened behind the scenes that gave the Administration confidence a deal could be reached -- at least enough of a possibility of agreement to risk putting the President's prestige on the line. The fact that 120+ other leaders would be in Copenhagen created a sense of mild optimism for a meaningful outcome. I kept tamping down my expectations in the weeks leading up to COP, but hope still existed.
It was difficult to tell what the Chinese strategy was over the first week and a half in Copenhagen. It really seemed like it could have gone either way. The first week, they were fully in line with the G-77, which was making hard demands. (No more than 1.5 degrees of warming, a lot more funding, deeper emissions cuts from developed countries, etc.) But by all accounts, countries nearly always start off stretching the bounds of what's likely or possible, and give way only later on in the negotiations, with incentives and deals and compromises.
Sadly, compromise was not forthcoming, and progress was very slow. Nations were still very far apart heading into the second week of negotiations. By Tuesday, the second week of the COP, the Chinese were still spouting the hard line "blame the US and the West" rhetoric at their evening press briefing (which took place at 5 PM at their delegation offices, in a little couch area and an adjoining press conference room dubbed the "China Information and Communication Center 中国新闻与交流中心"). Things did not look good ... yet I continued to wonder if this was simply a negotiating tactic, to extract more concessions from the West. No one was truly countenancing failure. In the meantime, much of the rhetoric was coming from the G77 + China bloc, not only China per se, so it was hard to pin it on them. (G77 efforts really seemed well-coordinated, at least on the PR front. You had islands noisily protesting with the help of NGOs; you had G77 spokesperson Lumumba di-Aping of Sudan making dramatic pronouncements about the culpability of developed nations; and you had China, India and others backing them up in a united front.)
On Wednesday, with only 3 days left, we were hoping for the best, but I had a bad, bad feeling that the COP would end without agreement. Throughout the day, I kept turning to my friends and saying, "I hope COP doesn't fail. It would be horrible if things just imploded." It was starting to seem a distinct possibility.
No positive news came out of Bella Center that day. (There was restricted entry, so the Stanford delegation was taking turns getting in with secondary passes. I was in downtown Copenhagen for the afternoon -- the first time I had seen sunlight in several days -- but then the Bella Center stopped NGOs from exiting/entering around 2 p.m., so I wasn't able to make it back in for the 5 p.m. Chinese briefing. However, my friend went to a different briefing by the Finance Minister, and she reported similar rhetoric, specifically on MRV.)
On Thursday morning, things looked absolutely dire -- media were reporting that the Danes were admitting the likelihood of failure, and the Chinese were saying that only a "short political statement" could be expected. But then Secretary Clinton gave her $100 billion in funding speech, and hope was reignited. I spoke to some people familiar with how China operates at these international negotiations, and was told that now the Americans had taken action, had offered something, the door was open to a deal. (I wrote a posting about this here: http://copenhagentime.
MRV (measurement, reporting, verification), the major sticking point, wouldn't have to be intrusive; verification strategies could be devised that were acceptable to all parties -- measures that would respect China's sovereignty, but give enough confidence to the Americans (especially the Senate) that the Chinese were living up to their end of the deal. At that point, it was up to the Chinese to reciprocate: things looked more optimistic, and the stage was set for a potential deal. There was even talk of greater "flexibility" by the Chinese, and media reports transmitted this revived hope.
I kept thinking that with the arrival of Wen Jiabao, the Chinese would suddenly change their tune, at least behind closed doors. The Chinese wouldn't want to be spoilers (or at least wouldn't want to be seen as spoilers), and they were simply waiting for an appropriate moment to make an announcement, perhaps in conjunction with Obama.
But on Friday morning, Wen declined to attend the "group" negotiations with other heads of state, including Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, etc. This was simply shocking! What were the Chinese doing?!? Obama reportedly went to negotiate with Wen on a bilateral basis afterwards, and a US official said that the talks were "constructive" and "made progress." (By the way, is this standard operating procedure at the State Department? To always say that the talks are making progress, even if they are rocky, in order to encourage greater cooperation?) We all held onto hope for a last-minute breakthrough. (In any case, according to media filings and e-mail updates from the one Stanford individual who got into the Bella Center, things were at a standstill in the plenaries, so it was really up to the U.S. and China.)
Then came the end. After the mad dashing about by world leaders on Friday, what we had was the weak agreement -- so far from all expectations that it was nearly a failure. Comedic, really, when you consider that Obama had to barge into a meeting between China, Brazil, India and S. Africa to get it done. (Okay, apparently he did not "barge" per se, but his presence was not exactly planned.)
I was exiting the Copenhagen Central Station, and I remember looking up at the news ticker and seeing the line "Obama and Wen are in a meeting." Shortly thereafter, at the hotel I had just checked into that day, I turned on CNN. They said that Obama had met with Brazil, China, India and S. Africa and an announcement was imminent. He was consulting with the EU and others, and once that meeting concluded, a press conference would start.
It was very ironic, because I saw the Obama announcement of the "breakthrough" before most of the delegates in Bella Center, because he had pre-recorded his remarks after wrapping things up in the small group meeting, and then left for D.C. I had the UNFCCC webcast open, and the reporters were all still sitting around waiting for the announcement, while CNN was already playing the tape of Obama's recorded speech. I can see why some of the delegates from small nations were livid -- they hadn't been consulted about this "Copenhagen Accord". It had been negotiated by a small group of countries, and now it was tossed on them and they were expected to agree to it!
On the plane ride home from Copenhagen, I sat next to a Fijian observer with links to her country's delegation, who was actually present in the Bella Center for the last two days. She was furious at the turn of events and at the oh-so-weak "agreement" (you could hear the " " quotation marks when she spoke about it, ha ha =D). She was deeply frustrated by the COP process and the UN bureaucracy, disappointed with Obama and what he brought to Copenhagen, angry at Nasheed of the Maldives for buying into the final "agreement".
As we discussed what transpired in Copenhagen, it suddenly dawned on us what the Chinese had been up to. More explanation is needed, but in short, we simply asked ourselves the questions: "What were the incentives for China to act? What motivated the Chinese?"
They were already committed to reducing carbon intensity -- this was going to happen, whatever the outcome at Copenhagen. Then in the first week, the U.S. pretty much eliminated any possibility for funding for China. (The Chinese were quite angry about this statement. This is when they called Todd Stern "extremely irresponsible" and lacking in "common sense", ha ha ha.)
So the choices for China were to:
1) Help usher in a climate deal and avoid being painted as a bad guy who blocked a deal; or
2) Flex its muscle and show the nation's status as a rising power. Demonstrate that the rest of the world needs China on board.
Apparently, they chose option 2. It was a warning shot to the U.S. that in this and future endeavors, Washington will require Beijing's help. We must take their views into consideration. It continues a trend where the Chinese are gaining confidence and saying to the West, "We will not be dictated to." As the Fijian put it, "They were never here to play ball." Instead, they were in Copenhagen to make a statement.
To put it another way, what would have been more valuable for the Chinese? To gain a gold star and international plaudits as a "cooperative player" in the global effort to fight climate change? Or to send an unmistakable signal to the Americans that China has arrived on the world stage and will no longer remain compliant -- and more importantly, that it now has the power to back up that approach? (And in the process, embolden Brazil, South Africa and India to also take a stand.)
One reading of this turn of events: For some time, China has wanted to be seen as a global leader. And it's starting to seem as if they don't envision their role as a soft consensus builder, bridging the developed and developing world. All the talk about "peaceful rise" and "responsible stakeholder" not withstanding, they want to be a robust and independent foreign policy actor. Their "core" national interests -- whatever they define them as, whether it's something as small as sovereignty and verification, or as serious as China's claim over Xinjiang -- are hard constraints that must be taken into account as such. These constraints can't be pressured away or bought off. And in the end, China didn't risk much at Copenhagen to send this message.
Indeed, by the end of the week, I don't think they really cared much about their own international reputation; things were so muddy that blame could easily be tilted anywhere. It becomes a he-said, she-said, and frankly, the U.S. does not have much credibility in this fight, especially because the Chinese had made a commitment before Copenhagen.
And what about jumping ship at the last day, abandoning the united bloc of the G-77? The G-77 + China had actually shown fractures throughout the conference, because some of the small island nations wanted stricter targets an stronger commitments from even the larger developing nations. But China had also consistently sought greater inclusion of developing countries in the negotiation process. Well, to put it another way, the Chinese used this as a reason to slow or block progress, and did not agree to things like smaller group negotiations. Yet on the last day, at the very end of the conference, the Chinese did not hesitate to drop the "all developing countries must participate" banner and take part in the closed-door negotiations to work out the final agreement. The Chinese were unmistakably a linchpin in the group of countries that worked to finalize the Accords -- basically, G-20 plus some additional developing nation representatives -- and the critical role they would have to play in any deal was clear. I suspect you could feel the smug satisfaction radiating from the Chinese. This I think is the real prize that they captured.
The Chinese held all the cards. They didn't need us; we needed them! It honestly did not matter if a strong or a weak agreement was reached at Copenhagen. They had a unilateral carbon intensity goal they set out to do voluntarily (and they will follow through because it makes their industry more competitive! It's something they want). That's all that was on the table for them. Once the funding went away, there wasn't much else the Americans could give to sway them to do more; the Americans didn't really have anything they wanted. (Even if Obama wanted to make more cuts, he couldn't outrun Congress. And whatever amount of funding the West decided to give to the developing countries for adaptation and mitigation, it could always be spun as a shortcoming on the part of the developed world. 跟中国无关). Furthermore, as public opinion has it, the Chinese don't have to do more -- given "common but differentiated responsibilities" and the Kyoto framework, as a developing country, they really aren't committed to anything. The carbon intensity cuts are a goodwill gesture and it sets them up nicely in the media's narrative on what happened at Copenhagen.
The Fijian lady considered MRV an excuse for China to obstruct, not a legitimate reason. And given the possibility for reaching agreement on that issue, I am now inclined to agree. It was a justification for holding up an agreement, not a deep and abiding concern. If they had wanted to, there were many ways out of that thicket.
So if you look at their incentives for reaching an agreement and what plausible goals the Chinese might have had, climate was never a paramount interest. My main mistake -- one also committed by others -- was deluding myself into thinking that "stopping climate change" was their priority, rather than understanding how they were driven by considerations of national interest that lie outside the realm of energy, the environment or even economics.
In Copenhagen, realism bites back.
Feel free to leave remarks or give your own analysis of what happened.
How could this have happened? With mild hopes and expectations seemingly tempered by past experience and current conditions, COP15 was set to achieve a "politically binding" agreement, with a COP15.5 next year to finalize details. Why was the outcome so far from what all parties had been expecting?
I analyze here the role China may have had in these negotiations. It was only on Sunday, after chatting with Yue Li, and then in discussion with a Fijian conference participant on the plane to Frankfurt on Monday, that the terrible realization of what China was up to dawned on me. When I arrived in Calgary, the BBC was reporting Milliband's piece in the Guardian and China's response. Then the next day, a former professor sent me this article discussing how the Chinese delegation behaved, and it was a sad confirmation.
Many of us made the mistake of assuming they had made climate change a priority; we bought into the narrative that "China is greening. The country is doing everything it can to fight climate change, which China itself is vulnerable to. However, it does face certain economic constraints and developmental priorities, which are not unreasonable." We should have realized that, behind the scenes, other forces may have been motivating the Chinese.
Things looked a lot better going into COP15, especially when Beijing announced its carbon intensity commitment back in November. It was a catalyst for India, Brazil and South Africa to follow suit, and it set a positive tone for the negotiations. Though the targets were unambitious, most people thought these represented a starting point for the negotiations -- much as the EU had said 20% reductions were committed, and they would raise it to 30% if a meaningful agreement could be reached. India explicitly stated that its goal (20-25% reduction in carbon intensity) was only a starting point, and it might do more if an “equitable” agreement could be reached. Unfortunately, rather than a starting point for bargaining, the Chinese offer turned out to be the final asking price.
Tack onto that Obama's visit to Beijing in November, and the fact that he changed his arrival in Copenhagen from Dec. 9, the beginning of the conference, to Dec. 18, the last day, and it seemed like something had to have happened behind the scenes that gave the Administration confidence a deal could be reached -- at least enough of a possibility of agreement to risk putting the President's prestige on the line. The fact that 120+ other leaders would be in Copenhagen created a sense of mild optimism for a meaningful outcome. I kept tamping down my expectations in the weeks leading up to COP, but hope still existed.
It was difficult to tell what the Chinese strategy was over the first week and a half in Copenhagen. It really seemed like it could have gone either way. The first week, they were fully in line with the G-77, which was making hard demands. (No more than 1.5 degrees of warming, a lot more funding, deeper emissions cuts from developed countries, etc.) But by all accounts, countries nearly always start off stretching the bounds of what's likely or possible, and give way only later on in the negotiations, with incentives and deals and compromises.
Sadly, compromise was not forthcoming, and progress was very slow. Nations were still very far apart heading into the second week of negotiations. By Tuesday, the second week of the COP, the Chinese were still spouting the hard line "blame the US and the West" rhetoric at their evening press briefing (which took place at 5 PM at their delegation offices, in a little couch area and an adjoining press conference room dubbed the "China Information and Communication Center 中国新闻与交流中心"). Things did not look good ... yet I continued to wonder if this was simply a negotiating tactic, to extract more concessions from the West. No one was truly countenancing failure. In the meantime, much of the rhetoric was coming from the G77 + China bloc, not only China per se, so it was hard to pin it on them. (G77 efforts really seemed well-coordinated, at least on the PR front. You had islands noisily protesting with the help of NGOs; you had G77 spokesperson Lumumba di-Aping of Sudan making dramatic pronouncements about the culpability of developed nations; and you had China, India and others backing them up in a united front.)
On Wednesday, with only 3 days left, we were hoping for the best, but I had a bad, bad feeling that the COP would end without agreement. Throughout the day, I kept turning to my friends and saying, "I hope COP doesn't fail. It would be horrible if things just imploded." It was starting to seem a distinct possibility.
No positive news came out of Bella Center that day. (There was restricted entry, so the Stanford delegation was taking turns getting in with secondary passes. I was in downtown Copenhagen for the afternoon -- the first time I had seen sunlight in several days -- but then the Bella Center stopped NGOs from exiting/entering around 2 p.m., so I wasn't able to make it back in for the 5 p.m. Chinese briefing. However, my friend went to a different briefing by the Finance Minister, and she reported similar rhetoric, specifically on MRV.)
On Thursday morning, things looked absolutely dire -- media were reporting that the Danes were admitting the likelihood of failure, and the Chinese were saying that only a "short political statement" could be expected. But then Secretary Clinton gave her $100 billion in funding speech, and hope was reignited. I spoke to some people familiar with how China operates at these international negotiations, and was told that now the Americans had taken action, had offered something, the door was open to a deal. (I wrote a posting about this here: http://copenhagentime.
MRV (measurement, reporting, verification), the major sticking point, wouldn't have to be intrusive; verification strategies could be devised that were acceptable to all parties -- measures that would respect China's sovereignty, but give enough confidence to the Americans (especially the Senate) that the Chinese were living up to their end of the deal. At that point, it was up to the Chinese to reciprocate: things looked more optimistic, and the stage was set for a potential deal. There was even talk of greater "flexibility" by the Chinese, and media reports transmitted this revived hope.
I kept thinking that with the arrival of Wen Jiabao, the Chinese would suddenly change their tune, at least behind closed doors. The Chinese wouldn't want to be spoilers (or at least wouldn't want to be seen as spoilers), and they were simply waiting for an appropriate moment to make an announcement, perhaps in conjunction with Obama.
But on Friday morning, Wen declined to attend the "group" negotiations with other heads of state, including Obama, Sarkozy, Merkel, etc. This was simply shocking! What were the Chinese doing?!? Obama reportedly went to negotiate with Wen on a bilateral basis afterwards, and a US official said that the talks were "constructive" and "made progress." (By the way, is this standard operating procedure at the State Department? To always say that the talks are making progress, even if they are rocky, in order to encourage greater cooperation?) We all held onto hope for a last-minute breakthrough. (In any case, according to media filings and e-mail updates from the one Stanford individual who got into the Bella Center, things were at a standstill in the plenaries, so it was really up to the U.S. and China.)
Then came the end. After the mad dashing about by world leaders on Friday, what we had was the weak agreement -- so far from all expectations that it was nearly a failure. Comedic, really, when you consider that Obama had to barge into a meeting between China, Brazil, India and S. Africa to get it done. (Okay, apparently he did not "barge" per se, but his presence was not exactly planned.)
I was exiting the Copenhagen Central Station, and I remember looking up at the news ticker and seeing the line "Obama and Wen are in a meeting." Shortly thereafter, at the hotel I had just checked into that day, I turned on CNN. They said that Obama had met with Brazil, China, India and S. Africa and an announcement was imminent. He was consulting with the EU and others, and once that meeting concluded, a press conference would start.
It was very ironic, because I saw the Obama announcement of the "breakthrough" before most of the delegates in Bella Center, because he had pre-recorded his remarks after wrapping things up in the small group meeting, and then left for D.C. I had the UNFCCC webcast open, and the reporters were all still sitting around waiting for the announcement, while CNN was already playing the tape of Obama's recorded speech. I can see why some of the delegates from small nations were livid -- they hadn't been consulted about this "Copenhagen Accord". It had been negotiated by a small group of countries, and now it was tossed on them and they were expected to agree to it!
On the plane ride home from Copenhagen, I sat next to a Fijian observer with links to her country's delegation, who was actually present in the Bella Center for the last two days. She was furious at the turn of events and at the oh-so-weak "agreement" (you could hear the " " quotation marks when she spoke about it, ha ha =D). She was deeply frustrated by the COP process and the UN bureaucracy, disappointed with Obama and what he brought to Copenhagen, angry at Nasheed of the Maldives for buying into the final "agreement".
As we discussed what transpired in Copenhagen, it suddenly dawned on us what the Chinese had been up to. More explanation is needed, but in short, we simply asked ourselves the questions: "What were the incentives for China to act? What motivated the Chinese?"
They were already committed to reducing carbon intensity -- this was going to happen, whatever the outcome at Copenhagen. Then in the first week, the U.S. pretty much eliminated any possibility for funding for China. (The Chinese were quite angry about this statement. This is when they called Todd Stern "extremely irresponsible" and lacking in "common sense", ha ha ha.)
So the choices for China were to:
1) Help usher in a climate deal and avoid being painted as a bad guy who blocked a deal; or
2) Flex its muscle and show the nation's status as a rising power. Demonstrate that the rest of the world needs China on board.
Apparently, they chose option 2. It was a warning shot to the U.S. that in this and future endeavors, Washington will require Beijing's help. We must take their views into consideration. It continues a trend where the Chinese are gaining confidence and saying to the West, "We will not be dictated to." As the Fijian put it, "They were never here to play ball." Instead, they were in Copenhagen to make a statement.
To put it another way, what would have been more valuable for the Chinese? To gain a gold star and international plaudits as a "cooperative player" in the global effort to fight climate change? Or to send an unmistakable signal to the Americans that China has arrived on the world stage and will no longer remain compliant -- and more importantly, that it now has the power to back up that approach? (And in the process, embolden Brazil, South Africa and India to also take a stand.)
One reading of this turn of events: For some time, China has wanted to be seen as a global leader. And it's starting to seem as if they don't envision their role as a soft consensus builder, bridging the developed and developing world. All the talk about "peaceful rise" and "responsible stakeholder" not withstanding, they want to be a robust and independent foreign policy actor. Their "core" national interests -- whatever they define them as, whether it's something as small as sovereignty and verification, or as serious as China's claim over Xinjiang -- are hard constraints that must be taken into account as such. These constraints can't be pressured away or bought off. And in the end, China didn't risk much at Copenhagen to send this message.
Indeed, by the end of the week, I don't think they really cared much about their own international reputation; things were so muddy that blame could easily be tilted anywhere. It becomes a he-said, she-said, and frankly, the U.S. does not have much credibility in this fight, especially because the Chinese had made a commitment before Copenhagen.
And what about jumping ship at the last day, abandoning the united bloc of the G-77? The G-77 + China had actually shown fractures throughout the conference, because some of the small island nations wanted stricter targets an stronger commitments from even the larger developing nations. But China had also consistently sought greater inclusion of developing countries in the negotiation process. Well, to put it another way, the Chinese used this as a reason to slow or block progress, and did not agree to things like smaller group negotiations. Yet on the last day, at the very end of the conference, the Chinese did not hesitate to drop the "all developing countries must participate" banner and take part in the closed-door negotiations to work out the final agreement. The Chinese were unmistakably a linchpin in the group of countries that worked to finalize the Accords -- basically, G-20 plus some additional developing nation representatives -- and the critical role they would have to play in any deal was clear. I suspect you could feel the smug satisfaction radiating from the Chinese. This I think is the real prize that they captured.
The Chinese held all the cards. They didn't need us; we needed them! It honestly did not matter if a strong or a weak agreement was reached at Copenhagen. They had a unilateral carbon intensity goal they set out to do voluntarily (and they will follow through because it makes their industry more competitive! It's something they want). That's all that was on the table for them. Once the funding went away, there wasn't much else the Americans could give to sway them to do more; the Americans didn't really have anything they wanted. (Even if Obama wanted to make more cuts, he couldn't outrun Congress. And whatever amount of funding the West decided to give to the developing countries for adaptation and mitigation, it could always be spun as a shortcoming on the part of the developed world. 跟中国无关). Furthermore, as public opinion has it, the Chinese don't have to do more -- given "common but differentiated responsibilities" and the Kyoto framework, as a developing country, they really aren't committed to anything. The carbon intensity cuts are a goodwill gesture and it sets them up nicely in the media's narrative on what happened at Copenhagen.
The Fijian lady considered MRV an excuse for China to obstruct, not a legitimate reason. And given the possibility for reaching agreement on that issue, I am now inclined to agree. It was a justification for holding up an agreement, not a deep and abiding concern. If they had wanted to, there were many ways out of that thicket.
So if you look at their incentives for reaching an agreement and what plausible goals the Chinese might have had, climate was never a paramount interest. My main mistake -- one also committed by others -- was deluding myself into thinking that "stopping climate change" was their priority, rather than understanding how they were driven by considerations of national interest that lie outside the realm of energy, the environment or even economics.
In Copenhagen, realism bites back.
Feel free to leave remarks or give your own analysis of what happened.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Oh China
This was all over the BBC last night.
The talks were chaotic, at times farcical. But in the accord there were real gains we can build upon
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/20/copenhagen-climate-change-accord
China Defends Climate Talk Stance (Associated Press)
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/12/22/world/AP-AS-China-Britain-Climate.html
China says Britain sowing discord in climate politics (Reuters)
http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINTOE5BL03020091222
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/20/copenhagen-climate-change-accord
Britain blames China for climate talks' failure (Reuters)
http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE5BK1H0.htm
http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE5BK1H0.htm
--- vs. ---
China Defends Climate Talk Stance (Associated Press)
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2009/12/22/world/AP-AS-China-Britain-Climate.html
China says Britain sowing discord in climate politics (Reuters)
http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINTOE5BL03020091222
Sunday, December 20, 2009
Sigh(s)
Depressing post from the BBC's Richard Black on the implications of the, uh, "Copenhagen Accord" on climate change negotiations; the way collective action will be manifested; and the future of the UNFCCC as a mechanism for international coordination. Some key points:
What appears to have happened is that the UN process was effectively ambushed by countries that perhaps don't want there to be a UN process....
Intriguingly, the morning after the deal was announced by White House press release, it wasn't clear whether it counts as an agreement within the UN system or whether it lies outside. If parties had adopted the deal, it would be a UN issue. But they didn't, because there was no consensus; instead governments only decided to "take note" of the accord.
...
During their discussions afterwards, several delegations suggested this means it isn't a UN agreement - and various UN officials gave different interpretations. If it turns out not to be a UN agreement, then - at the extreme end of things - the UN climate convention could effectively be dead as the powerful world's favoured instrument for controlling emissions. A deal made at a UN summit would move outside, being a free-standing arrangement effectively decided by the 26 countries involved in the drafting. It will mean that a select group of countries - the G20, or thereabouts - will basically decide what they want to do, and then do it.
...
Does Copenhagen, then, mark not the beginning of a new global climate regime but the end of the vision of global, negotiated climate governance? Is it the end for the idea of global, negotiated governance on other environmental issues?
Maybe this post should be called "Collective Sighs Post-COP15". I'm really interested in seeing where this issue of environmental governance and international environmental regimes go ... We should ask Wara or Weyant when we get back to Stanford.
Saturday, December 19, 2009
Collateral Damage - REDD goes under?
Lack of a final deal means other issues in the climate talks, such as REDD, may also be casualties -- even though there was substantial support and agreement for these parts of a deal. I don't follow REDD closely (you should check with Matt Colgan, one of my roommates here in Copenhagen, who has been sticking with it through the whole COP) -- but it was one of the bright spots in the whole process. It would be a tragedy if it sank with the foundering "comprehensive" agreement.
I became worried when I saw this article:
Forest Plan Gets Ax at UN Climate Talks (Dec 19, 2009)
By Michael Casey, The Associated Press
COPENHAGEN -- A plan to protect the world's biologically rich tropical forests was shelved early Saturday after world leaders failed to agree on a binding deal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Delegates scrapped plans for a comprehensive climate agreement that would have included the deal to pay poor countries to protect their forests. The program is known as REDD for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation.
''REDD gets punted along for another year,'' said Kevin Conrad, executive director of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, which includes many of the 40 tropical countries that would take part in the program. ''It's depressing,'' he said. ''It means I've got to spend another year ... coming to meetings and talking about the same things.''
The burning or cutting of trees for logging and to clear land for plantations or cattle ranches is blamed for about 20 percent of global emissions. That's as much carbon dioxide as all the world's cars, trucks, trains, planes and ships combined. About 32 million acres (13 million hectares) of forests are cut down each year -- an area about the size of England or New York State -- and the emissions generated are comparable to those of China and the United States, according to the Eliasch Review. Deforestation for logging, cattle grazing and crops has made Indonesia and Brazil the world's third- and fourth-biggest emitters.
''The failure of the U.N. process to agree on a system to fund and regulate the protection of the world's forests means that business as usual logging and forest conversion will continue,'' said Stephen Leonard of the Australian Orangutan Project. ''No treaty means that forest destruction will continue unabated, forest dependent peoples rights will not be protected and endangered species will continue down the path to extinction.''
REDD would be financed either by wealthy nations or by a carbon-trading mechanism -- a system in which each country would have an emissions ceiling, allowing those who undershoot it to sell their emissions credits to over-polluters.
---
UPDATE 1: Karim says it is still on the final draft, so hopefully the program can still be created/effectively implemented.
UPDATE 2 (12/20/09): One paragraph regarding REDD-plus is included in the final Copenhagen Accord. Two other points on REDD were not included.
P.S. REDD-plus is what we call India's provision to pay countries for enhancing carbon stocks (by planting trees), in addition to preventing deforestation.
Friday, December 18, 2009
Seesaw Depressing Day
It's been up and down today. Went to sleep around 6 or 7 a.m. happy that the door was now open for an agreement, because the US had moved. We were waiting, then, for China to respond.
I had a bit of a suspicion that this might not pan out the way we hoped, so I sent a caveat to the Stanford list, following up.
P.S. In case it wasn't clear ... this note is not saying any of this *will* happen. It's saying that there's a possibility, a potential opening, so don't completely despair. Hopefully the Parties will take it up and keep working toward an agreement.
It's also possible that political exigencies will overtake what seems to be a real possibility. As Lily Cheng pointed out last night, the US and China both know what they have to do on climate. But there are definitely things that can still get in the way.
Then this morning, I awoke to reports that Wen Jiabao did *not* attend the meetings with other world leaders, including Pres. Obama, and instead sent another Chinese official. WTF! What is China doing?
This did not bode well. The rest of the day seemed to fluctuate, sometimes with pessimistic news, other times with hopeful notes. It was all just so unclear. I saw some articles that said progress was again possible, because US had offered funding, and China was showing "flexibility" on international verification. But then bad news about Wen ...
The whole afternoon, I just couldn't shake the feeling that the COP was failing, and we were going to wake up tomorrow morning with everything having imploded, no agreement reached, nothing close to what we hoped coming through this conference.
Later in the day, though, I heard news that Obama and Wen were meeting alone (bilaterally), so perhaps some discussion was happening. In news reports, the meeting was termed "productive".
Brief exchange with Arlo, Stanford's communications specialist at COP15 who is live-blogging the event. I e-mailed to him:
I'm only [now feeling] a little depressed, because while the window of opportunity is open, China is not moving forward to seize it. They're still holding rigid, playing a political game of brinksmanship. Given the constraints of its domestic political situation, the US has done something to hold open the door. Now we need the Chinese to reciprocate.
I have been hearing conflicting reports all day; some are very pessimistic, some are saying the Chinese are warming up. The Prime MInister did NOT attend the group meeting(s) with Obama, but later, Obama and Wen Jiabao did meet bilaterally.It is unclear what's happening, Karim's appraisals seem very down, news reports aren't shedding much light except that there's a new draft text in case the conference fails. Sad.
Two cents (0.136 RMB) on China + some analysis
While negotiations seemed deadlocked earlier today, measures taken this afternoon may have revived hopes for an agreement in Copenhagen.
Two of the major stumbling blocks to reaching an agreement at COP15 have been the positions of the United States and China. The general feeling from both developing countries and our European friends (see here and here) is that the U.S. offer to reduce emissions is underwhelming. (The U.S. proposes reducing its GHG emissions 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, equivalent to reducing 3-4% below 1990 levels). American suggestions of $10 billion in funding to developing countries through 2012 have also been criticized as inadequate.
Conversely, the refusal of the Chinese to accept MRV requirements -- measuring, reporting, and verification -- claiming that it violates national sovereignty, is a major sticking point with the Americans. It’s been cleverly couched by the Chinese as, We aren't taking [getting?] your funding. And since you aren’t paying for any of these projects, no MRV. Or as Wen Jiabao said on Thursday:
China has indicated that its 2020 carbon intensity goal counts as a voluntary action at the international level, though it will be legally required at the domestic level. These points of contention have held up negotiations for several days, with a pretty pessimistic outlook this morning.
"For developing countries, only those mitigation actions supported internationally will be subject to the MRV." Any "voluntary mitigation actions [that China takes on by itself] should not be subject to international MRV.”
However, by late this afternoon, things just might have shifted. At an event in the evening put on by the BlueGreen Alliance (a uniting of workers and environmental groups to further the agenda for "good jobs, clean environment, green economy"), I ran into Barbara Finamore, the head of NRDC’s China program, who has decades of experience working in the country and who has contacts well-positioned to know how the Chinese delegation operates at international negotiations. (See her quote in the New York Times on December 15. By the way, for transparency's sake, I should note she was my boss when I worked in NRDC's Beijing office in 2007.)
Barbara felt that Secretary of State Clinton’s announcement -- that the U.S. will help raise funding of $100 billion for developing countries to deal with climate change -- could break the logjam. Since the U.S. has made a move, it is now up to China, which has been asking for more concrete steps from the Americans all along, to reciprocate.
According to Clinton (transcript of speech and related article):
"the United States is prepared to work with other countries toward a goal of jointly mobilizing 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the climate change needs” of developing nations.In other words, this effort to mobilize funding ("from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance") will commence only if (1) a deal is reached, and (2) the deal must include measures that ensure "transparency" and the ability to conduct MRV. The funding will have a "significant focus on forestry and adaptation" and is "particularly ... for the poorest and most vulnerable" countries.
However, this must be done "in the context of a strong accord in which all major economies stand behind meaningful mitigation actions and provide full transparency as to their implementation.''
Several members of the G77 have already sent messages to the Chinese indicating that they are amenable to this plan because they truly need and want the funding, and have asked the Chinese to make a deal possible. (This group includes the Maldives, Ethiopia and Bangladesh. See here.) This is not to say all G77 countries are convinced. Lumumba di-Aping of Sudan, who acts as chief negotiator of the G77, said, "This is a good signal, but it's still insufficient. We need more money." (Quoted here.)
On the Chinese side, some leaders are worried that that MRV could mean intrusive actions, such as factory-level inspections, with foreign experts entering individual facilities to ascertain whether China is living up to its carbon intensity goals. They feel this is a major affront to sovereignty. Beijing says that it will make its efforts transparent, and compliant with national laws and regulations, and this should be good enough. Or as He Yafei, vice-foreign minister, put it, China’s laws would guarantee compliance. (Mentioned in NYTimes article from December 15. Ugh, don't get me started on how this seems preposterous.)
Finamore and others have been attempting to convince parties on both sides that intrusive inspections of this sort are not what MRV is about, and such drastic measures are, in fact, not needed to verify that the Chinese are meeting their commitments. For one, China publishes data about its electricity generation, fuel use and energy use every year. The data are publicly available, and other international institutions (including multilateral lending institutions like the Asian Development Bank) make full use of it.
If the Chinese can continue working toward transparency and publicizing their actions, there is enough information in these and other reports to track progress in emissions reductions. The Chinese can feel that respect for their sovereignty is upheld, while the Americans (the Senate in particular) can be confident that the Chinese are not only taking on some of the global burden, but that the international community can verify progress.
If the Chinese can continue working toward transparency and publicizing their actions, there is enough information in these and other reports to track progress in emissions reductions. The Chinese can feel that respect for their sovereignty is upheld, while the Americans (the Senate in particular) can be confident that the Chinese are not only taking on some of the global burden, but that the international community can verify progress.
Some of you will ask, How do we know China will actually publish accurate statistics? What if officials fudge the numbers?
For example, in the last Five-year Plan that runs through 2010, there was an energy intensity target, which would work much the same way this new carbon intensity target is supposed to work. Provincial leaders are evaluated in part based on whether they meet this target or not. Don’t they have an incentive to lie?
While there are many examples of this problem in China, and it remains an ongoing concern, there are also several factors that can mitigate the problem, at least when it comes to energy and GHG emissions reporting:
While there are many examples of this problem in China, and it remains an ongoing concern, there are also several factors that can mitigate the problem, at least when it comes to energy and GHG emissions reporting:
1. The Chinese government needs these statistics, too. As Lily Cheng pointed out, Beijing wants accurate data to work with.
2. A revision to the Statistics Law (more details here) was passed this year and comes into effect in January 2010. It imposes severe penalties (potentially even jail time) for leaders that fake or alter statistics. This should be a big deterrent.
3. Increasing energy efficiency and reducing emissions are things many local leaders want to do voluntarily. According to Finamore, mayors and other officials understand that these measures make enterprises more competitive and that it saves them money.
So the incentives line up in a way that should make energy statistics more believable and accurate. China, of course, can continue to make its domestic situation more transparent and potentially allow more independent auditing. But the measures wouldn’t have to be as intrusive as people think.
Neither the U.S. or China is likely to make a move that makes it look like it is capitulating on key matters -- but the gap between the two sides has begun to close, and thus, Finamore says “the door is open” for some form of an agreement.
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Additional points:
1. This situation could potentially further fracture the unity of the G77 + China grouping. As noted above, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Ethiopia, among others, have contacted the Chinese to express their support for an agreement in the wake of this announcement. Furthermore, in a televised debate, the president of the Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, even criticized the idea being floated by some of the G77 and China that "no deal is better than making a bad deal." According to The Australian, Nasheed said that "we are in the G77 and we want an agreement from Copenhagen. We do not agree with that viewpoint at all [that failing to make a deal would be better than a bad deal]. We have to have an agreement."
On the other side, in addition to Sudan/G77 head Lumumba di-Aping's intonation for "more money," Brazil has also raised concerns about "intrusive verification," while Ecuador's foreign minister noted that “What we really need are firm mechanisms to reduce emissions from industrialized countries. Financial mechanisms are useful, but not central, not a solution.” (Quoted in the New York Times).
This kind of split is probably not something China wants to preside over. It also wants to avoid the even worse position of being seen as the cause of failure at COP15. This all adds up to more impetus for the Chinese to respond. Since Chinese premier Wen Jiabao arrived on Wednesday, he has met with Brazil, Bangladesh, Trinidad, Ethiopia and Sudan. The U.S. in turn, has been meeting with India (among other G77 members) and may be reaching an agreement. Jairam Ramesh, India's minister of the environment and forestry says that the two countries agree on about "75% of things", and the last 25% is on ... you guessed it, MRV.
2. See this piece about the varying interpretations of when MRV can/should be applied to projects that countries undertake. US says all actions to reduce emissions by developing countries should be subject to MRV. Many developing nations say that only projects that get outside funding should have MRV requirements. This conflict dates back to the Bali Action Plan, and much of the debate centers around the placement of a comma in the text (!), which took delegates more than two hours to discuss. (!!!)
3. If worse comes to worse, another NRDC expert said that a bilateral statement by the US and China to jointly combat climate change might be the next best option. Let's hope it doesn't come to that.
4. Associated Press has a good article on the implications of the U.S. offer on aid.
5. Check out Barbara Finamore's blog at NRDC's website with commentary on Copenhagen, as well as China's environment and its energy situation.
Things don't look so good...
December 17, 2009. Around 11:30 a.m.
An official in the American delegation said that China would agree only to a brief political declaration that left unresolved virtually all the major issues.
The conference has deadlocked over emissions cuts by, and financing for, developing nations, including China, who say they will bear the brunt of a planetary problem they did little to create. Leaders had hoped to conclude an interim agreement on the major issues that would have “immediate operational effect.” The Chinese, it appears, are not willing to go that far at this meeting.
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A Danish official acknowledged that hope was running out for a comprehensive climate deal because the negotiations between rich and poor countries were deadlocked. The official said the Danish hosts of the U.N. conference had not given up though it appeared unlikely that their ambitious plan for the conference would be fulfilled. ''As it looks now, we will not get the deal that we had hoped for,'' said the official, who is not authorized to speak publicly about the talks and asked not to be named.
China told participants it saw no possibility of achieving a detailed accord to tackle global warming ... the Chinese had instead suggested issuing "a short political declaration of some sort."While the overall picture appears bleak, there has been some progress in areas critical to reaching a deal. Africa dramatically scaled back its expectations for climate aid from rich nations on Wednesday, and Japan pledged about $11 billion in public funds to 2012 to help poor countries adapt to a warmer world and cut their emissions.
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So yeah, it's unclear if Denmark et al are trying to tamp down expectations, in case the whole COP really does implode, or if they actually believe it's going down the drain now. I'm also not sure if the Chinese are truly digging in and refusing to budge, or if this is just brinksmanship, i.e. a negotiating tactic. Either way, it's upsetting -- and it feels kind of irresponsible for them to be doing this.
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The United States, Australia, France, Japan, Norway and Britain pledged $3.5 billion in the next three years to a program aimed at protecting rain forests. The U.S. portion was $1 billion.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Reducing Emissions: An evening with the “numbers”
The life of a diplomat can be tough. It’s not all glitz and glamour—and you don’t always get to stand up at the podium making grand pronouncements of principle.
Shortly after 9 p.m. tonight, a contact group of the AWG-KP—that’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol—gathered in the Hans Christian Andersen meeting room. (As Prof. Schneider explained it, a contact group is formed when there’s a sticking point during the plenary, the main negotiating sessions, a particular issue that needs to be hashed out or clarified. Then all the interested countries dispatch representatives to work on crafting an understanding on that point, while the rest of the plenary moves on and discusses other issues on the agenda.)
The Belarussian delegate checks her e-mail while the contact group softly hums in the background.
Shortly after 9 p.m. tonight, a contact group of the AWG-KP—that’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol—gathered in the Hans Christian Andersen meeting room. (As Prof. Schneider explained it, a contact group is formed when there’s a sticking point during the plenary, the main negotiating sessions, a particular issue that needs to be hashed out or clarified. Then all the interested countries dispatch representatives to work on crafting an understanding on that point, while the rest of the plenary moves on and discusses other issues on the agenda.)
In our case, the representatives were there to discuss the emissions reductions that each country in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol would be willing to commit to, and then determine what those emissions reductions would add up to in aggregate.
Sounds like a sexy topic, right? You’d expect fireworks and grand-standing and denunciations as the debate heated up over who should commit and why and how much. Well, the session wasn’t the verbal sparring match we anticipated. For a couple of hours, we mostly stared at a projection of a table:
The two columns read:
- Quantified emissions limitation or reduction commitment (2008-2012) (percentage of base year)
- Quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment ([2013-2017][2013-2020]) percentage of base year or period
The brackets indicate that content inside the [ ] is up for discussion. The contact group got underway, with various delegations making statements under the Powerpoint glow.
Micronesia: It might be best to leave this. We are straying quite far from where we hope to be. (Editor's note: She sounds like Vienna Teng … lyrical, musical voice) (Muzicon)
Chinese delegate: I doubt whether we are making progress and question if we should be here at this late hour, if all we are doing is repeating these old lines (Muzicon)
Since the discussion did not seem to be getting anywhere, the chair suggested that meeting in a “smaller group” as opposed to the wider “contact group” to try to work through some of the issues. She then fielded responses to this proposal. The session then spent the next hour discussing how to proceed (as opposed to the substance of the agenda.)
The process of diplomacy is sometimes … well, I’d venture *often* ... like this. It seems a hard to be a diplomat, especially when you’re dealing with minute details that will wear down your teeth. (Or in this case, deciding what exact procedure would be appropriate for you to begin wearing down your teeth).
My friend Eric Yang Yi pointed out that this kind of working session is very much like 苦功 hard work, hard labor. The participants basically sit there, and go line by line, nitpicking the text, the exact phrasing of each line, mostly contesting the particular language in the document, though in some cases also raising points of principle, Phrasing probably has legal and political rammifications, which is why they do it, and it's important work. (However, it seemed like a lot of these caveats and clarifications imported long-standing arguments to the discussion, which is why some delegates felt like things were moving backwards). The verb Eric used in Chinese to describe the process is 磨, meaning "to grind." It’s exactly like that: a wheelstone grinding against rocks, until the final product is polished—or at least in close enough shape to pass back to the larger plenary.
In fact, when we left, the contact group was still going, though delegates were visibly wilting, and some were showing their frustration. Cearly, they were very dedicated people, and as the Chinese delegation put it: "We're willing to stay here all night, if we are making progress toward an agreement." But many of them felt that they were simply spinning wheels without getting "the numbers" down.
I would have stayed longer to catch the end of the tale, but I didn't want to miss the last Metro out of Bella Center. I was afraid there wouldn’t be any trains after midnight.
(This entry is an impression of the proceedings of an AG-KWP contact group that took place on the evening of December 14, 2009 at the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, Denmark. While descriptions are faithful to what was observed from 9-11:50 p.m. from a particular individual's vantage point, the author makes no claims of its accuracy as a reflection of the COP process or of AG-KWP contact groups in general. The author takes no responsibility for the reaction of readers or their actions subsequent to reading this blog.)
Eric surreptiously having his photo taken with Yu Qingtai, one of the Chinese negotiators.
The Belarussian delegate checks her e-mail while the contact group softly hums in the background.
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